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Abstract 
This is the second part of a paper devoted to the study of the maximal intermediate 
propositional logics with the disjunction property (we will simply call maximal constructive 
logics), whose first part has appeared in this journal with the title “A method to single out 
maximal propositional logics with the disjunction property I”. In the first part we have 
explained the general results upon which a method to single out maximal constructive logics is 
based and have illustrated such a method by exhibiting the Kripke semantics of maximal 
constructive logics extending the logic ST of Scott, for which, in turn, a semantical characteriza- 
tion in terms of Kripke frames has been given. In the present part we complete the illustration of 
the method of the first part, having in mind some aspects which might be interesting for 
a classification of the maximal constructive logics, and an application of the heuristic content of 
the method to detect the nonmaximality of apparently maximal constructive logics. Thus, on 
the one hand we introduce the logic AST (“anti” ST), which is compared with ST and is seen as 
a logic “alternative” (or even “opposite”) to it, in a sense which will be precisely explained. We 
provide a Kripke semantics for AST and (without exhibiting them) show that (near the ones 
including ST and the ones including AST) there are maximal constructive logics which neither 
are extensions of ST nor are extensions of AST. Finally, we give a further application of the 
results of the first part by exhibiting the Kripke semantics of a maximal constructive logic 
extending AST. On the other hand, we compare the maximal constructive logics presented in 
both parts of the paper with a constructive logic introduced by Maksimova (1986), which has 
been conjectured to be maximal by Chagrov and Zacharyashchev (199 1); from this comparison 
a disproof of the conjecture arises. 
1. Introduction 
The reader is assumed to know “A method to single out maximal propositional 
logics with the disjunction property I”, already appeared in this journal and quoted in 
* Corresponding author. 
0168-0072/95/$09.50 C 1995- Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved 
SSDI 0168-0072(94)00052-2 
118 M. Ferrari, P. Miglioli /Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 76 (1995) I I7- I68 
the references as [S]. Indeed, the present reatment is a prosecution and a complement 
of [S], and is intended as the second part of a single paper on the maximal intermedi- 
ate propositional logics with the disjunction property (we will more briefly call 
maximal constructive logics). The aims of the whole paper and the criteria according 
to which the material has been distributed in the two parts have been explained in the 
introduction of [S]; thus, we will only briefly describe the content of the next sections 
and recall the main notions and results to be taken from [S]. 
The numberings of the sections, propositions, theorems and corollaries of the 
present part will not be a prosecution of the ones of [S], but will restart with the 
number 1. Since frequent references to the sections and the results of [S] will be made, 
we will quote the latter by writing “I” before their number in [5] (thus, e.g., Section I.3 
will be Section 3 of [5], Theorem I.1 1 will be Theorem 11 of [S], etc.). 
In the next section, which completes the treatment of Section 1.4, we will present he 
filtration technique of the selective models and will compare it with the technique of 
the quotient models introduced in Section 1.4. The selective models technique, applied 
in connection with special filtration formulas such as the extensively complete ones 
used in [S], will be the main tool to prove the completeness theorems of the 
subsequent Sections 3 and 4. 
In Section 3, which can be seen as a completion of Section 1.5, we will treat the logic 
AST (“anti” ST), already presented in the introduction of [5] as a counterpart of the 
logic ST of Scott (treated in Section 1.5). We will provide a Kripke semantics for AST 
and will prove the related soundness and completeness theorems. Moreover, we will 
reconsider ST, which will be compared with AST; this comparison (involving the 
constructive incompatibility of ST and AST and the maximality of their fragments in 
one variable in the set of the constructive logics) should explain the sense according to 
which we look at ST and AST as “alternative” from the point of view of a classifica- 
tion. Finally, using a special technique combining proof-theoretic and semantical 
tools, we will prove the existence of a constructive logic which is constructively 
incompatible both with ST and with AST; in a classification oriented attitude this will 
indirectly show (by means of Zorn’s lemma) the existence of maximal constructive 
logics which are neither “scottian” nor “antiscottian” (where a “scottian” maximal 
constructive logic, like the ones presented in Section 1.6, includes ST, while an 
“antiscottian” maximal constructive logic, like the one to be presented in Section 4, 
includes AST). 
In Section 4 we will exhibit the Kripke frames semantics of an “antiscottian” 
maximal constructive logic. In doing so, we will provide a further illustration of the 
method explained in [S]. Thus, by suitably restricting the class FAST of Kripke frames 
for AST given in Section 3, we will get a maximal nonstandard constructive logic 
E(CAST) including AST, which will turn out to be the regular nonstandard logic 
generated by a suitable class 9’ cAST of “canonical” frames (uniquely determined by 
their final states); the corresponding standard logic generated by F&sT will be proved 
to be neg.sat.-determined, hence, by Theorem 1.9, it will turn out to be a maximal 
constructive logic. To read this section, the previous reading of Sections I.2 and I.3 is 
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necessary (on the other hand, the results of Section 4 are not based on the results of 
Section 1.6, even if the former can be seen as a completion of the latter). 
In Section 5 we will reanalyze, from an heuristic point of view, the main semantical 
properties of the maximal constructive logics illustrated in both parts of the paper 
(Section I.6 and Section 4), and will look for possible maximal constructive logics 
having different properties. In this line, we will consider a constructive logic introd- 
uced in [13] by L. L. Maksimova, we call the logic of the rhombuses and denote by 
RH, which has been conjectured to be maximal by Chagrov and Zacharyashchev in 
[3]. We compare the semantical characterization of the apparently maximal construc- 
tive logic RH with the semantical characterization of the really maximal constructive 
logics exhibited in our paper, and put into evidence important differences, involving 
the corresponding regular nonstandard logics. The results of this comparison have 
been for us the starting point to discover a proof that, indeed, RH is not maximal. 
A sketch of this proof will be given which (disregarding the comparison of the 
maximal constructive logics of Sections I.6 and 4 with RH and the involved heuristic 
aspects) should be grasped also by those readers who are interested in RH and in the 
related conjecture, but do not wish to take into account the other aspects of the paper. 
Finally, in Section 6 we will discuss some open problems and possible new 
directions of research 
In the following, the reader should be familiar with the basic notions and results of 
[S], in particular: the notions of intermediate propositional logic (more simply, logic), 
intermediate propositional nonstandard logic (more simply, nonstandard logic), con- 
structive logic, nonstandard constructive logic, maximal constructive logic and maximal 
nonstandard constructive logic (Section 1.2); the notion of neg.sat.-determined logic 
(Section 1.2); the operators E (extension operator) and S (standardization operator) on 
the nonstandard logics (Section 1.2); the restricted substitutions, the negatively 
saturated formulas and the negatively saturated substitutions (Section 1.2); the posets 
(also called Kripke frames or, more simply, frames), the Kripke models and the regular 
Kripke models (Section 1.3); the property (s.d.e.p.) (Proposition 1.13, Section 1.3); the 
saturated sets and the canonical models (Section 1.4); the relations between maximal 
constructive logics and maximal nonstandard constructive logics (Theorems I.5 and 
1.6, Section 1.3); the relations between the operator E and the regular Kripke models 
(Theorem 1.8, Section 1.3); the result on the maximalitv of the neg.sat.-determined 
logics generated by classes of frames giving rise to regular nonstandard logics which 
are maximal nonstandard constructive logics (Theorem 1.9). 
As in [S] and without loss of generality, we will consider only Kripke frames with 
least element (root) and with the property of theJina1 states (see Section 1.3). We will 
adopt the conventions and notations of [S], in particular: INT and CL will be, 
respectively, intuitionistic (propositional) logic and classical (propositional) logic; the 
operator + will be used to define standard logics (e.g., if L and L’ are standard logic% 
then L + L’ will be the smallest standard logic including both L and L; if G’ is a set of 
formulas or a set of axiom-schemes and L is a standard logic, then L + & will be the 
smallest standard logic including L and, according to the cases, all the formulas of 
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d or all the instances of the elements of ~2); if tl is any state of a Kripke frame P, then 
Fin(a), (or also Fin(a) if ambiguities do not arise) will be the set of final states of 
P following a; Y(9) and Y&P’) will be, respectively, the (standard) logic and the 
regular (nonstandard) logic generated by a class 9 of frames; if L is a standard or 
a nonstandard logic and r is a L-saturated set, then W,(T) will be the L-canonical 
model generated by r; if H is any wff, Sf, ,+,7 (H) will be the set of all the wff’s which 
can be built up starting from the subformulas of H and using only the connectives 
A, + and 1; given a Kripke model K = (P, 6,0, It) and a wff H, cH will be the 
relation on P such that, for any two a, /I E P, CI $, /l iff, for every B E Sf, ,,,,(H), c1 Ik B 
implies B It B; given a Kripke model K = (P, G,O, It ) and a wff H, Z~ will be the 
equivalence relation on P such that, for any two c?, /I E P, M =_H j? iff CI GH p and 
p EH cc; finally, for any Kripke model K and any wff H, K/ GH will denote the quotient 
model of K with respect o EH defined in Section 1.4. 
2. The filtration technique of the selective models 
In Section I.4 we have presented the filtration technique of the quotient models, 
based on the relations cH and Ed. Now, using the same relations, we present the 
more sophisticated technique of the selective models (which is a refinement of the one 
of [S] and has been already explained in [16,4]) according to the following points. 
- Let K = (P, 6, It ), let CI and /I be two elements of P and let H be a wff, we set 
M tH fi iff the following conditions are satisfied: 
(l) a =H b; 
(2) for every y such that IX < y in K and CI fH y, there is 6 in K such that j3 < 6 and 
y-H& 
- An element CC* EP is said to be tH-terminal iff, for every /I E P such that tl* < /I and 
CP -_H p, we have a* +H p. 
Since, as seen in [S], the number of =,-equivalence classes is finite, one has: 
Proposition 1. Let K = (P, 6, It ). For every c( EP there is a* EP such that c( < a*, 
cI =H c(* and c1* is +H-terminal. 
- Let K = (P, 6, It ) and let CI* be any +,-terminal element of K. An element j?* E P 
is called a cH-immediate successor of IX* in K iff: 
(I) g* T&8*; 
(2) cI* < /I*. 
(3) there is no y in P such that a* $ y Q fl*, LX* fH y and /?* gH y; 
(4) p* is +,-terminal. 
- Let CC* be any +&erminal element ofK; a set {CL:‘, . .. ,c$“} is called a complete set of 
+,-immediate successors of CI* in K iff the following conditions are satisfied: 
(1) ,$, . . . ,c$ are +-,-immediate successors of CC* in K; 
(2) for every i, j such that 1 d i, j d k and i #j, MT’ sH aj*” does not hold; 
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(3) for every element B* of K such that /I* is a +-,-immediate successor of c(* in K, 
there is i, 1 < i d k, such that cc*” sH /i’*. 
The finiteness of the number of the =,-equivalence classes and Proposition 1 yield 
[16, 41: 
Proposition 2. For every +,-terminal element a* of K such that [a*] is not a final 
element of Kl Ed, there exists k 2 1 together with +-n-terminal elements aTS, . . . ,c$’ of 
K such that {a:‘, . . . ,u:‘} is a complete set of +n-immediate successors of a* in K. 
- Let K = (P, <, 0, II ). By KSe'JH, called a basic selective model of K with respect to 
H, we will mean any Kripke model (P', Q', O*, Ii-' ) defined as follows: 
(1) The least element of the poset (P', <') is a +,-terminal element 0* of K belong- 
ing to the rH-eauivalence class [0] of the root 0 of K. 
(2) Let a* be any nonfinal element of (P', 6',0*); then the immediate successors 
*s 
ai ,..., a:’ of a* in (P', 6',0*) are such that {a;‘, . . . ,c$ } is a complete set of 
+,-immediate successors of a* in K. 
(3) Let a* be an element of P'; then if p is a variable of H then a* II-’ p iff a* It p in K; 
if p is a variable which does not occur in H, then a* It’p. 
Again, the finiteness of the number of the equivalence classes of --H gives rise to the 
following proposition [ 16, 41: 
Proposition 3. For every K and H, the model K”“‘IH is jnite. 
We can prove (see also Proposition 8): 
Proposition 4. For every regular K and every H,K”“‘JH is regular. 
A model we really need is K""jH, called a selective model of K with respect to H, 
which is obtained by taking the quotient of the final states of KSe'/H, as follows: 
- K”“/H is a Kripke model (P", <",O*, II") obtained from a model 
KSe’/H = (P’, <‘, O*, IF’ ) by the following procedure: 
(1) The set of nonfinal elements of (P" , 6",0*) coincides with the set of nonfinal 
elements of (P', <',O*) and <” on this set coincides with G’. 
(2) The set of final elements of (P" , <",O*) coincides with the set of =,-equiva- 
lence classes [c$*] (defined in the whole model K) such that $* is a final element 
of (P', G/,0*). 
(3) If a* and [c#J] are respectively a nonfinal element and a final element of 
(P", <",O*), then a* <“[$I iff there is an element $* of KSe’/H such that 
a* 6’ d* and 4* --H 4. 
(4) If a* is a nonfinal element of (P", <",O*) and p is any variable, then a* It” p iff 
a* 11’~. 
(5) If [4] is a final element of (P" , <", 0*) and p is any variable, then [c$] II” p iff, 
for every final element $* of K”“/H such that II/* =H 4, we have that $* It’ p. 
The following fact follows immediately from Proposition 3 [16, 41: 
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Proposition 5. For every K and every H, the model K”“IH is finite. 
The two following propositions, proved in [16, 41, give the main properties of 
K”“/H: 
Proposition 6. For every A E Sf .,,,,(H) and for every element cx* of K”“/H, one has: 
(i) Zfu* = [4] is aJina1 element ofK”“/H, then tl* It” A (in K”“/H) ifs4 It A in K. 
(ii) Zfa* is not a final element ofK”“/H, then CI* IF” A (in Kfi”/H) iJfcr* IF A in K. 
Proposition 7. Let PI = (PI, G1) and P2 = (P2, Go) respectively be the underlying 
poset of KEEP and of K”“/H. Then, for every nonjinal element c(* EP~, 
Fin( [cr*]),, = Fin(cc*),,. 
Also for K”“/H, using Propositions I.9 and 6, we can deduce: 
Proposition 8. If K is a regular Kripke model and H is any formula, then K”“/H is 
a regular Kripke model. 
Like Proposition I.18 in the case of the quotient models technique, Proposition 6 
provides the basis to use the selective models to prove the completeness theorems of 
(standard) logics. An application of the selective models technique to completeness 
theorems of regular nonstandard logics requires also Proposition 8. 
Proposition 7, on the other hand, gives a first comparison of the models K/ =,, and 
K”“/H obtained from the same K and the same H. 
In [S] the quotient models technique has been strengthened by special filtration 
formulas, namely, the extensively complete formulas introduced in Section 1.4. For- 
mulas of this kind will be used also in the present part of the paper, in order to increase 
the power of the selective models technique, to be applied in the two next sections. 
However, in the applications of the selective models technique we will consider, not all 
the properties of the extensively complete formulas will be necessary; indeed, the 
negatively complete formulas will be sufficient (where an extensively complete formula 
is both complete and negatively complete, in the sense explained in Section 1.4). Here, 
to help the reader, we recall the definition of negatively complete formula. 
- Given any finite set v of variables, the set of negated formulas containing only 
variables of v is divided into a finite set of equivalence classes [1& by intuitionis- 
tic biimplication. By a v-complete set of negated formulas we mean any (finite) set 
{lC 1, . . . ,l C,} satisfying the following conditions: 
(1) for every equivalence class [l B],, there is an i, 1 < i < h, such that 
1 Ci E [lB]o; 
(2) for every i, j with 1 < i, j < h and i #j, [l Ci]” # [1 Cj]“. 
- Let W be a wff and let VW be the set of its propositional variables. Let 
N={1C l, . . . ,l C,} be a Y&-complete set of negated formulas and let N1, . . . ,N, 
be all the nonempty subsets of N. Let, for every j with 1 <j < m, DN, be the 
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disjunction of all the formulas of Nj. Finally, let Zk = DN, A ... A DN,. We say that 
W is a negatively complete formula if Zb is a subformula of W. 
Since for every wff H there is a wff W such that H is a subformula of W and W is 
negatively complete, arguing as for Proposition 1.20 we get: 
Proposition 9. Let L be a logic (respectively, a regular nonstandard logic) and let 9 be 
a nonempty class of posets such that, for every L-saturated set r and every negatively 
complete formula W, %‘L(T)fi”/ W is built on a poset of 8. Then 2(F) E L (respect- 
ive/y, Y,,,(F) C L). 
In the following, we will apply the selective models technique using arbitrary 
filtration formulas or, according to Proposition 9, negatively complete filtration 
formulas. 
Remark. Even if it is more sophisticated, the selective models technique (with or 
without special filtration formulas) is not necessarily more powerful than the quotient 
models technique. For instance, we know cases where only the latter can be applied (a 
discussion on this point can be found in [16]). Also, all the completeness theorems of 
[S] can be treated with the selective models technique too; but this technique makes 
considerably more difficult the treatment of some logics of Section 1.6. 
3. The logic AST and its relations with the logic ST 
Now we study “anti” Scott’s logic. AST, quoted in Section 1 and syntactically 
characterized as INT + {(AST)}, where (AST) is the axiom-schema 
(((11/I ~A)-+AvlA)+lAvllA)-tllAv(llA -A). To provide 
a semantical characterization of AST, we define the class FAST of frames as follows: 
_ Let P = (P, <) be a poset and let c1 E P; we say that c1 is a l-state iff IFin(cc)l = 1 
(where “1 . . . 1” denotes the cardinality of a set). 
- FAST is the class of all the finite frames P = (P, <) satisfying the following property: 
For every c1 E P, if c1 is not a final state of P then one of the following conditions (a) 
and (b) is satisfied: 
(a) All the immediate successors of c( are l-states. 
(b) For any two immediate successors p and y of cI in P, if fl and y are not final states 
then Fin@) = Fin(y). 
First of all, we prove: 
Proposition 10. AST c _Y(pAST). 
Proof. Assume the contrary. Then there is a Kripke model K = (P, <, 0, It ) together 
withaninstance(((llA -A) -+AvlA) -+lAvllA)-+llAv(1lA-+A) 
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of (AST) such that (P, <, 0) E FAST and Ol~(((1lA+A)+AvlA)+ 
1‘4v11A)+11Av(11‘4+A). Hence, there is u E P such that CI !- 
((1lA -+A) -+AvlA) -+lAvllA and alrllA v(llA +A). It follows 
thattherearepEPandyEPsuchthatcrdp,a~y,pl~lA,yl~llAandyl~A. 
From these facts, using the properties of FAST, we can prove that there is 6 E P such 
that the following properties hold: 
(ii) There is E E P such that E is an immediate successor of 6, E is a l-state and 
EIklA. 
(iii) There is 9 E P such that ye is an immediate successor of 6, r Ik 11 A and 4 ly A. 
As a matter of fact, let a’ be an immediate successor of CI such that a’ < y. We will 
consider two cases, i.e., LX’ Ik 11 A and Co If 11 A. 
If a’ 11 11 A, let fi’ be an immediate successor of c( such that /I’ d /I. Since /I It 1 A 
and a’ It 11 A, we must have Fin(cc’) # Fin@‘). Now, if all the immediate successors 
of c( are l-states, setting 6 = CX,E = p’ and q = a’, Conditions (i)-(iii) are immediately 
satisfied. Let us assume that not all the immediate successors of a are l-states. Then, 
since ~1’ is not final, by the properties of the posets of 9&r we have that /I’ is final, 
hence B = /I’, hence /I’ IF 1 A. Also in this case, setting 6 = CI,E = /I’ and n = LX’, 
Conditions (i)-(iii) are satisfied. 
Suppose that a’ Iv 11 A. Then there is j3” E P such that CI’ 6 /I” and /I” Ik 1 A. Here 
we set a, = c~‘,/jr = /I” and yi = y, in such a way that crl,bl and y1 play respectively 
the roles of the states c(, /I and y considered above (i.e., c(r II- ((1lA + A) + 
Av~A)~~A~~~A,a~d~~,a~6y~,~~It1A,y,It~~Aandy,I~A).Argu- 
ing as above for TV, j3 and y, we get states 6, E and 9 satisfying Conditions (i)-(iii), or 
states CY+ p2 and yz playing the same roles as c(r, /I1 and yr (and as c(, /I and y). Since, by 
definition of FAST, the poset P is finite, in the second case we eventually reach states 
6,s and q satisfying (i)-(iii), q.e.d. 
Now, we prove that 611 (ii,4 -+A) +lAv-mA. For, 6lrllA +A fol- 
lows from (iii). Moreover, if all the immediate successors of 6 are l-states, then, 
for every 6’ such that 6 d 6’ and 6 # 8, we have that 6’ Ik 1 A or 6’ It 1lA. 
Finally, suppose that not all the immediate successors of 6 are l-states. Then, 
by the properties of P and by (iii), all the nonfinal immediate successors of 6 force 
1lA (while, of course, any final immediate successor of 6 forces 1 A or forces 
11 A). It follows that, if 6 < 6’ and 6 # 6’, then 6’ It 1 A or 6’ IF 11 A, which proves 
our assertion. 
On the other hand, 6 It ((1lA -A) +lAvl-~A) +lAvllA, since 
(as seen in Section I.4 to state Proposition 1.22) the formula 
((1 i A + A) + 1 A v ii A) + i A v 11 A is intuitionistically equivalent to 
((liA+A) +AvlA)+lAvllA. Thus, from the above we obtain 
6 Ik 1 A v 11 A. This contradicts the above points (ii) and (iii). 0 
Now we prove the completeness of AST using the selective models technique with 
arbitrary filtration formulas: 
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Theorem 1. If L is any nonstandard logic such that AST G L, r is any L-saturated set 
and H is any formula, then %‘L(r)fin/H is built on a poset of FAST. 
Proof. Assume the contrary. Then, in the poset P’ = (P’, <‘) on which VL(T)li”/H is 
built, there is a state d* satisfying the following properties: 
(1) in P’ there is an immediate successor ZT of A* such that ET is not a l-state; 
(2) in P’ there are two nonfinal immediate successors 2: and Zz of A* such that 
Fin(Ez) # Fin(Z”:). 
From (1) and (2) we immediately obtain that in P’ there are two nonfinal immediate 
successors CT and Z”; of A* such that: CT is not a l-state or Ct is not a l-state; 
moreover, Fin(CT ) # Fin(C: ). We can suppose, for the sake of definiteness, that C,* is 
not a l-state and that Fin(Cz) is not included in Fin(C:); we consider two cases: 
Case 1: For any two immediate successors 2; and 2: of A* in P’, one of the 
following conditions is satisfied: 
(i) ET and E,* are l-states; 
(ii) Fin(E:) = Fin@“:); 
(iii) Fin(ET)nFin(Er) = 8. 
Now, let ~T,l,...,~:,m,~T,m+l,~T,l,..., @& (m 2 1, n 2 1) be final elements of P 
satisfying (according to the above) the following conditions: 
- Fin(CT) = {c$:,~ ,..., QT.,}; 
- QT.,+ 1 E Fin( Zz); 
-- Fin@*) = {@T,r, . . . ,@?,,, QT.,,,+ r} u{@?,r, . . . ,@?,,>; 
- {~T,1,...,~T.,,~T,,+l}n{~31,,, . ..&.> = 0. 
Since Cs is not a l-state, there exists an element of Fin( C:) which is different from 
@T,??l+,. Let, for the sake of definiteness, Qiz, 1 E Fin( Z:). 
Then, since Sf,,,,, (H) is closed under A, by definition of %?:L(I’)fi”/H and by 
Proposition 6, there is a formula Bi E SF,,,,,(H) such that @pT,i IF’ Bi and, for every 
O* EP’ different from @JT,~, O* If’ Bi, where 11’ is the forcing of GF?~(~)~~“/H. In 
particular, @T,jly’Bi for i #j and 1 d j < m + 1, and @,T,h Iy’Bi for 1 6 h < n. It 
followsthatC~I~‘~~B,+,andthat@~,,It’~(B1v ... vB,vllB,+i).Letusset 
A=Brv ... vB,,,v~~B,+~. We immediately have: 
- for every i with 1 d i < m + 1, @T,i It’ A; 
- for every j with 1 < j < n, ~2*,j It-’ 1 A. 
Now, we want to prove that A* It ((iiA -A) +iAvllA) +-~AvllA, 
where IF is the forcing of the canonical model gL(f). To do so, we preliminarily 
prove: 
(iv) Let Z* be any immediate successor of A* in P’ such that Fin@*) = Fin(Cz), 
and let 0 be any element of GZL(r) such that 0 =H E*. Then 0 IF11 A + A and 
OlylAvllA. 
To state (iv), first of all we remark that 1 A and 1lA are intuitionistically 
equivalent to formulas of Sf, ,_,? (H) (since A is a disjunction of formulas of 
Sf A,,,,(H)). Hence, from ,Zz Ir'lA and C: Iv’ ii,4 (which immediately comes 
from the above) one gets E* 1%’ 1 A and E* If’11 A, which implies E* If 1 A and 
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E* If 11 A, which implies 0 Iv 1 A v 11 A. On the other hand, let Q be an element 
of VL(r) such that 0 6 Q ( d the ordering relation in qL(r)) and Q It 1lA. Let 
It” be the forcing of %?J~)/E~. Then, from Proposition 1.18, we obtain 
[0] It” 1lA. Let P“ = (P", <'I) be the poset on which %‘#)/G~ is built and let 
[Y] be an arbitrary element of Fin([SZ]),,,. From the above we get [Y] It” A. By 
Proposition 7, Fin([Cz])pf, = Fin(C$.., which implies that Fin(Q),,,, c Fin(Z$, 
i.e., that [Y] E Fin( CT),, . Thus, by Propositions I. 18, and 6, we get [Y] It’ A, where 
[Y] works as an element of Fin(Z‘:),*. Since (by (iii)) Fin( [CT]),, nFin(C$ = 0 and 
(as seen above) @& It’lA for 1 Q h d n, we must have [Y] = @T,,+ 1, with [Y] an 
arbitrary element of Fin([Q]),,.. It follows that Sz It llB,+i (in V,(T)), which 
implies 52 It A (in VL(r)), since A = Bi v ... v B, vii B,, 1. Thus, (iv) holds. 
Now we conclude the proof that A* IF ((1lA +A)+~Av~~A)+ 
1 A vi1 A. Suppose that there is an element A’ of %?#) such that A* < A’ (in 
wr,(r)), A’lk (1lA -+A)+iAvllA and A’l~-tAvliA. Then, first of all, 
A’ &, A*. As a matter of fact, otherwise, A* tH A’ (by definition of %:,(T)““/H), 
which implies that there is 0 such that A’ 6 0 and C,* EH 0, which implies, by (iv), 
A’lr (1lA + A) + 1 A vi1 A, a contradiction. It follows (by definition of 
VL(T)““/H) that there is an immediate successor E* of A* such that Z* sH A’. The 
state Z* cannot be a l-state, since, otherwise, Z* It’lA or E* It’ll A, which 
implies Z* It 1 A v 11 A, which implies A’ It 1 A v 11 A, a contradiction. Also, we 
cannot have Fin@*) = Fin(CT), since, by definition of A, we easily deduce 
E* 11’11 A, which implies A’ IF 1 A v 11 A, a contradiction. We therefore have, 
according to (i)-(iii), that Fin(B*)nFin(Cy) = 0. If Fin(E*) # Fin(C:), then, by 
(i)-(iii), Fin(Z*)nFin(Cz) = 8, which implies (being also Fin(Z*)nFin(ZT) = 0) 
Fin@*) E {G&, . ,@z,,}, which (by definition of A) implies E* 11’1 A, which implies 
A’ It 1 A vii A, a contradiction. It follows that Fin@*) = Fin(Z:), from which, 
arguing as in the proof of (iv), we get A’ It 11 A + A. Since 
A’lt-(~~A+A)+~Av~~A,weget A’I1lAvllA,acontradiction. 
We have therefore proved that A* IF ((11 A -+ A) +i A vi1 A) -+ 
1 A v 11 A, from which (since ((11 A + A) +iAviiA) +iAvliAis in- 
tuitionistically equivalent to ((ii A -A) +AviA)+lAv~iA, as seen in 
the proofs of Propositions I.22 and 10) we get A* IF ((iiA + A) 
+ A v 1 A) -+ 1 A v ~1 A. Since AST E L and V,(T) is a L-canonical model, A* 
forces every instance of the axiom-schema (AST). It follows that 
A* II 11 A v (11 A -+ A). The latter fact implies A* It 1~ A + A, since, as seen 
above, CT Iv 11 A and A* Q C:. But also A* It 11 A + A is impossible, since, from 
the above treatment, we get C: Ii- 11~4 and ZT ly A (C: is not final), with A* 6 ET. 
Case 2. There are two immediate successors ET and E:“: of A* satisfying the 
following properties: 
(PI) Zz is not a l-state. 
(P2) Fin@=“:) # Fin@;). 
(P3) Fin(Z”r)nFin(Ez) # 0. 
M. Ferrari, P. Miglioli / Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 76 (1995) I I7- I68 121 
Since neither ST nor 2; can be final states (otherwise, E’: <’ E T), we can assume, 
without loss of generality, that zy coincides with ET and ET coincides with 5;, where, 
according to the above conventions, CT is not a l-state. With these conventions, let us 
indicate (as in Case I) the underlying poset of V,(T)/=, with P” = (P”, G”) (the 
underlying poset of VL(T)““/H is still P’ = (P’, 6’)). We will say that an element 
52 of wL(r) is Z:-initial iff the following conditions are satisfied: 
(ci) In P’ there is an immediate successor E* of A* such that: Fin@*) # Fin(CT) 
and [E*] <“[Q] holds in P”. 
(cz) Fin( [s2])p1, E Fin( [C:]),,,. 
(cg) If 0 is an element of V,,(r) such that [0] # [Q] and [0] g” [a], then 0 does 
not simultaneously satisfy Conditions (cr) and (cJ (in place of 52). 
Let [Qi], . . , [C&J be all the =,-equivalence classes in which the set of z;-initial 
states of VL(r) is divided. One has that h > 1, since, by the hypotheses of Case 2, the 
set of ,X:-initial states turns out to be nonempty. Now, for every i with 1 < i < h, there 
is a formula KiESf,,+,,(H) such that [Szi] k”Ki in 9?L(r)/--H and, for every state 
[0] of VjL(r)/=H such that [Sz,] <” [0] does not hold, [O] If” Ki (in particular, 
if [v’] is a final state of P” such that [Y’]$Fin([ai]),,,, then Y Iv Ki). Let 
C@,.Il> ... 3 [QI,,,] be all the elements of Fin([CT]),,. which do not belong to 
Fin( [Q,])p~, u ... wFin( [st,,]fp,, (if any). For every j with 1 <j < m, we can single out 
a formula Zj E Sf, ,+,,(H) such that, for every state 0 of V,(T), 0 IF Zj (in V,(T)) iff 
0 E [~l,j]. Then, we set A = Ki v ... v K,,vZi v ... v Z, and divide the set of 
immediate successors of A* in the underlying poset P’ of %7L(r)fi”/H into three 
disjoint classes: 
Class Si: immediate successors E* of A* such that Fin(E*) E Fin(zT). 
Class Sz: immediate successors E* of A* such that Fin(E*)nFin(,$) = 8. 
Class S3: immediate successors %* of A* such that Fin(E*) _c Fin(C:) does not hold 
and Fin(E*) nFin( CT) # 8. 
Of course, Cy ES~ and CT ES~, while Sz may be empty. We can easily prove the 
following properties: 
(P4) If 0 is a state of VL(r) such that E* sH 0 for some E* E Si, then 0 11 11 A in 
VL(r) (note that 1 A and 11 A are intuitionistically equivalent o a formula of 
Sf ,.+.7(H)). 
(P,) If 0 is a state of VL(r) such that z* sH 0 for some E* E Ss, then 0 IF 1 A in 
VL.(0. 
(P6) If 0 is a state of $YL(r) such that E* =H 0 for some 8* E S3, then 0 Iv 1 A and 
0 IfllA. 
We can also prove: 
(P,) If 0 is a state of qL(r) such that E* gH 0 for some E* eS3, then 
0 It- 11 A + A in %‘Jr). 
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To prove (P,), let 0’ be an arbitrary element of VL(r) such that 0 6 0’ and 
0’ It 1lA. Then one easily proves that Fin( [@‘I),,, E Fin( [CF])p,,. Since in P’ one 
has by hypothesis that Fin(E*) # Fin(Cy), one can show that there is a state 52i of 
VL(r) such that I is .J5:-initial and [Szi] <“[@‘I (with 1 < i < h, according to the 
above). Since [Qi] lk”Ki, one gets 0’ It Ki in %YL(r), hence 0’ Ik A in VL(r). 
From (P6) and (P,) one immediately obtains: 
(P,) if 0 is an element of gL(r) such that s* z-H 0 for some E* ES~, then 
0 lf(iiA +A) +7Av77A in wL(r). 
From (P,) we get: 
(P,) If 0 is an element of gL(r) such that A* 6 0 and A* zH 0, then 
0 lf(iiA -+A) -+iAviiA in wL(r). 
To prove (P,), we remark that, by definition of V,(T)““/H, A* is +,-terminal, 
hence A* tH 0. It follows that in wL(r) there is a state 0’ such that 0 < 0’ and 
0’ =H CT. By (P,), we have 0’ ly (11 A -+ A) -+ 1 A v 11 A in wL(r), which im- 
plies (P,). 
Now, we can prove that A* It ((-ITA -A) -+-~Avi~A)+iAviiA in 
gL(r). Assume the contrary. Then there is an element A’ such that A* ,< A’, 
A’II- (11~4 -+A)+TAvTTA, but A’lf~Av~~A. By (Pg), we must have 
A* &, A’. Then, by definition of V1 (T)li”/H, there is an immediate successor E* of A* 
in P' such that E* sH A’. Since in VL(Z-) we have A’ Iv 1 A and A’ (f 11 A, from (P4) 
and (P,) we have that E*$Si and z*#S2. It follows that E* ES~, hence, by (P,), 
A’ It iit4 + A. Since A’ It (1114 +A)+lAvllA,weget A’ItlAvl1A, 
a contradiction. 
We have therefore proved that A* Ik ((ii,4 -+A) -+iAviiA) + 
1 A vi1 A in VL(r), from which, as discussed in Case 1, we obtain 
A*I~((~~A~A)-,Av~A)~~Av~~Ain~~(~).Thelatterfactgives,along 
the usual lines (since A* forces all the instances of the axiom-schema (AST)), 
A* II 11 A v (-11 A + A) in wL(r). Since A* Iv 11 A immediately follows from the 
above treatment, we must have A* It 11 A --+ A (in wL(r)). 
But A* Ik 11 A + A is impossible. As a matter of fact, let us suppose that there is 
some [Qi] of gL(r)/ EH such that Qi is _Xr-initial and [Qi] <” [c:] (with 1 < i < h). 
Then in P’ there is some immediate successor s* of A* such that [Z*] <” [Qi] and 
Fin@*) # Fin(Cf). It follows that [E*] G” [C:] and [E*] # [ET]. Since E* is an 
immediate successor of A* in P’, this implies, by definition of V&)““/H, that Cy is 
not an immediate successor of A* in P’, a contradiction. Thus, for every [L’i] of P” 
such that Qi is ,X:-initial, [Qi] <” [ET] does not hold (1 < i < h). It follows that 
cy Iv Kc for 1 < i < II, according to the above definition of the formulas Ki. Since we 
also have ,ET Iv Zj for 1 <j d m, we get CT ly A. On the other hand, Cl 11 11 A, by 
(Pa). Since A* < ET, we cannot have A* It 1lA + A. 0 
Theorem 1 and Proposition 10 immediately ield: 
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Corollary 1. AST = 2’(9&. 
AST is one of the logics treated in [l], and, according to the results of that paper, 
turns out to be constructive. On the other hand, a direct proof of the constructiveness 
of AST can be obtained using Proposition 1.13. As a matter of fact, it is easy to show 
that FAST satisfies (s.d.e.p.). We therefore have: 
Proposition 11. AST is a constructive logic. 
Now, considering the logic ST of Scott and the axiom-schema characterizing it (see 
Section I.5), we immediately have that the logic ST + AST coincides with 
INT + {(STAST)}, where (STAST) is the axiom-schema 1lA v (1lA -+ A); in 
particular, ST + AST contains the formula 11 p v (11~ + p), with p a proposi- 
tional variable, and there is no constructive logic L such that ST + AST c L. For 
otherwise, L should contain 11~ + p (since 11 p&L); hence, being closed under 
arbitrary substitutions, L would coincide with CL, which is not constructive (a bit 
more complicated argument shows that there is no nonstandard constructive logic L’ 
such that ST + AST c_ L’: as a matter of fact, e.g., 11 (p v q) and 11 (p v q) + p v q 
cannot belong to a nonstandard constructive logic). Thus, we have: 
Proposition 12. ST and AST are constructively incompatible. 
Incidentally, we remark that ST + AST turns out to coincide with the logic 
generated by the class of all the posets P = (P, <,O) satisfying the following prop- 
erty: for every nonfinal CI E P, Fin(a) = Fin(O). The related completeness theorem can 
be obtained by combining Theorems 1 and a completeness proof for ST provided by 
the selective models technique (which can be given, according to a remark at the end 
of Section 1.5). Another proof comes directly, without filtrations, using the method of 
the canonical models (see Section 1.4). 
Going on with the comparison of ST and AST, we remark that neither ST nor 
AST are maximal constructive logics, as it turns out as a by product of the results of 
Section I.6 and of the next section. On the other hand, as anticipated in the 
introductions of [S] and of the present part, these logics are constructively maximal in 
the fragment in one variable. 
To be more precise, let (ST), be the instance ((11 p + p) + p v 1 p) + 1 p v 11 p 
of the axiom-schema (ST), and let (AST), be the instance (((11 p + p) + 
p v 1 p) -+ 1 p v 11 p) + 1 -I p v (11 p -+ p) of the axiom-schema (AST). Then, 
from the properties of the Rieger-Nishimura lattice, one gets (see, e.g., [7], Chap. 6): 
(*) For every wff A(p) containing only the variable p, one of the following cases 
holds: 
(i) (ST), + A(p) E INT; 
(ii) (AST), + A(p) E INT; 
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(iii) A(p) is intuitionistically equivalent to exactly one of the WE’S: p A-IP, 
P~~P~~~P,1P”~~P,~~P +P,(llP -p) +P”lP,(llp -+P)“llP, 
((llP -P) -+P”lP)“(llP -+P),P”lP. 
Now, for any nonstandard logic L, let L(p) indicate the set of formulas {A/A EL 
and A contains only the variable p}. Let us consider, in particular, any set L(p) where 
L is a nonstandard constructive logic. Then, none of the formulas listed in the above 
Case (iii) of (*) can belong to L(p), as one easily sees; hence, Cases (i) and (ii) of (*) 
immediately ield the following maximality property of ST(p) and AST(p): 
Proposition 13. Let L be any nonstandard constructive logic. Then L(p) G ST(p) or 
L(P) E ASVP). 
Notice that Proposition 13 does not involve only standard constructive logics (as 
ST and AST are), but arbitrary nonstandard constructive logics. Now, taking into 
account the standard logics, one naturally asks whether the fragment in one variable 
of a maximal constructive logic is always maximal among the fragments in one 
variable of the logics satisfying the disjunction property. By Proposition 13, this 
question is equivalent to asking whether, for every maximal constructive logic L, 
either ST c L or AST G L. The answer to the latter question, however, is negative and 
is given by the following theorem: 
Theorem 2. There is a maximal constructive logic L such that neither ST c L nor 
AST E L. 
Proof (Outline). A detailed proof is given in Miglioli, Nota su logiche costruttive 
massimali, manuscript, 1989. Since it is considerably long and uses methods whose 
explanation is not the main concern of the present paper, we will only put into 
evidence the main points on which the proof is based. 
The goal of the proof is to define a constructive logic which is simultaneously 
constructively incompatible with ST and with AST. As a matter of fact, Zorn’s lemma 
entails the existence of a maximal constructive logic extending such a logic, as shown, 
e.g., in [lo]. 
The proof of our theorem consists of a general part (introducing methods which can 
be applied also to other situations) and a specific part (devoted to the definition of the 
constructive logic constructively incompatible with ST and AST). 
As for the general part, given a wff H, first of all we define what we mean by an 
H-formula and by an almost negatively saturated H-formula. A wff A will be an 
H-formula iff it is of the form B[p( H] for some formula B(p) in one variable p (where, 
as usual, “[ . . . 1 . . . 1” indicates substitution). A formula A is an almost negatively 
saturated H-formula iff A = 1 B and B is an H-formula, or A = B A C and B and 
C are almost negatively saturated H-formulas, or A = B v C and B and C are almost 
negatively saturated H-formulas, or A = B -+ C and B is an H-formula and C is an 
almost negatively saturated H-formula. 
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Let H be a wff. We say that a set LH of wffs is a H-logic iff LH is consistent, 
closed under modus ponens and arbitrary substitutions and satisfies the following 
properties: 
(a) For every A E LH, there is a substitution G together with a wff H’ such that 
H’ = oH and A is a H’-formula. 
(b) Let INT, = {A ) A E INT, and there is a substitution Q together with a wff H’ 
such that H’ = oH and A is a H’-formula}. Then INTH E LH. 
Likewise, given a wff H, we say that a set Lh of wff’s is an almost negatively saturated 
H-logic iff LL is consistent, closed under modus ponens and arbitrary substitutions 
and satisfies the following properties: 
(c) For every A E Lb, there is a substitution 0 together with a wff H’ such that 
H’ = oH and A is an almost negatively saturated H’-formula. 
(d) Let INTL = (A 1 A E INT, and there is a substitution cr together with a wff H’ 
such that H’ = aH and A is an almost negatively saturated H’-formula}. Then 
INT;, s Lh. 
Let iH be an H-logic or an almost negatively saturated H-logic. We say that 2, is 
constructioe iff A v B E 2, implies A E LH or B ELM. We also say that 
L El,? . . ..LH..Lk,, . . . . LLm (n 2 0, m 2 0, n + m 2 1) are a co-ordinate system ofconstruc- 
tive H ~,...,H,IZI,..., Z, logics iff LH, is a constructive HI-logic, . . . ,LH. is a construc- 
tive H,-logic, L>, is an almost negatively saturated constructive Z,-logic, . . , Lkm is an 
almost negatively saturated constructive Z,-logic and the following conditions are 
satisfied: 
(e) For every i, 1 6 i < n, every wff A, every substitution 0 and every wff Hi, if 
L,,v ... uL*,uL& ... UL&FpJT A, and Hi = aHi, and A is an Hi-formula, then 
A E LH,. 
(f) For every j, 1 < j < m, every wff B, every substitution c and every wff Zi, if 
LH, v ‘. . u LH. uL~, u ... uLkn kINT B, and Zi = OZj, and B is an almost negatively 
saturated ZJ-formula, then B E LL,. 
Using a (purely syntactical) proof-theoretic technique, i.e., the collection technique 
illustrated, e.g., in [15], we can prove: 
(I) If LHI, . . . ,L,,, Li,, . . ,Lk, are a co-ordinate system of constructive 
H l,...,H,zlZ~,..., Z, logics, then INT + LH,u ... uLH,uL~,u ... ULNA is a (stan- 
dard) constructive logic. 
We are interested in generating co-ordinate systems of constructive 
H,, . , H, 1 Z,, . . . ,Z, logics starting from classes of posets. To do so, we introduce the 
following definitions. 
Let 9 be a nonempty class of posets and let H be a formula. By the H-logic 
generated by 9 we mean the set dipH(9) = {A I A E U(9), and there is a substitution 
0 together with a wff H’ such that H’ = aH and A is an H’-formula}. On the other 
hand, the almost negatively saturated H-logic generated by F will be the set 
zp”H”“(Y) = {B I I3 E Y(F), and there is a substitution g together with a wff H’ such 
that H’ = oH and B is an almost negatively saturated H’-formula}. One readily sees 
that _PH(Y) is a H-logic and _Pz’(g*l) is an almost negatively saturated H-logic. 
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Now, let 9 be a nonempty class of posets and let X(9) be the class of all the 
Kripke models built on the elements of 9. Let H be a formula. We say that 9 is 
H-closed ifI, for every H’ and CJ such that H’ = OH, the following conditions hold: 
(g) either H’$2?VH(.F) or H’ E INT; 
(h) there is K= (P, <,O,lk)~,d"(.F) such that, for every K'= (P', <',O',#')E 
n‘(T) and every H’-formula A, if 0 II- A (in K) then 0’ IF’ A (in K'). 
We also say that .F is almost negatively saturatedly H-closed iff, for every H’ and 
cr such that H’ = CJH, the following condition holds: 
(i) there is K= (P, <,O,It )6X(.9) such that, for every K' = (P', <',O',lt')~ 
A"(F) and every almost negatively saturated H’-formula B, if 0 Il- B (in K) then 0’ 11’ B 
(in K'). 
We can prove: 
(II) Let 9 be simultaneously Hi-closed, . . . , H,-closed, almost negatively saturat- 
edly Z,-closed, . . . ,almost negatively saturatedly Z,-closed. Then _YH,(.Y), . , 
UHo(.F), _Y~“(.F), ,U~(.F) are a co-ordinate system of constructive HI, . . , H, 1 
Z 1, . . . ,Z, logics. 
This provides the general machinery to be used in the proof of the theorem. In the 
above quoted Miglioli, Nota su logiche constructive massimali, some criteria are also 
given in order to check whether a given 3 is H-closed or almost negatively saturat- 
edly H-closed. Here we omit these criteria for the sake of conciseness and turn to the 
specific part of the proof. In this line, we define p = (p, <^,6) to be the poset with 
seven states illustrated in Fig. 1. 
Now, we set .g = (p) and introduce the formulas fi and Z as follows: 
H = (lpvlq)r\(lp +llq); 




We can prove: 
(III) 9 is simultaneously H-closed and almost negatively saturatedly Z-closed. 
We set L = INT + 5!n(@b)~_Y’~~(~~). Then, combining (I)-(III), we have: 
(IV) t is a constructive logic. 
Let (ST)2 be the instance of the axiom-schema (ST) given by the formula 
((112 -2) -+ZviZ) --iZvilZ. We can show: 
(V) (ST)2 E Uy(@. 
Let (AST)n be the instance of the axiom-schema (AST) given by the formula 
(((1lA +A)+Av1E?) --+~Hv~~E?)+~~I?v(~~I?--+H).Then,thefol- 
lowing fact is immediate, since p belongs to %FAs.r: 
(VI) (AST)i, E 6pir(&). 
Using (V) we obtain: 
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Fig. 1 
(VII) i: and AST are constructively incompatible. 
Using (VI) we obtain: 
(VIII) t and ST are constructively incompatible. 
By Zorns’ lemma, (IV), (VII) and (VIII) provide the statement of our theorem. 0 
Remark. Since in the proof of the above Theorem 2 the poset P^ belongs to YAST, also 
(AST)z belongs to Yz(&), where (AST)z is the instance of the axiom-schema (AST) 
corresponding to the formula 2. Thus (being (ST)2 E_F$‘~,““(.~) and 
Ly”(.g) z Yz(.&)), both (ST)2 and (AST)z belong to .Uz(&, from which, arguing as 
in the proof of Theorem 2, it follows that INT + P”(g) cannot be extended into 
a constructive logic. However, (AST)i is not an almost negatively saturated .??-formula, 
hence (AST)i does not belong to L?‘~s(~@), which is the only set of formulas related to 
2 to be taken into account in the proof of Theorem 2. 
Notice that the non-constructiveness of any exten$on of INT 2 Uz($kis connec- 
ted wjth the presence of a substitutio! r~ a%d a off Zsuch=that z = ~2, Z E YE(.$), 
but Z$!N; Inteed, th;re is such a Z = (Z, vz, vZ3 vZ4)~Z5 where= the subfof- 
mulas 2,. Zz, Z, and Z4 are not classically valid (and, differently from Z, are not 2- 
formulas). 
Notice, on the other hand, that any positive subformula B of an almost negatively 
saturated H-formula A is an H-formula, where B is a positive subformula of A iff 
A = B, or A h 1s the form C A D or C v D and B is a positive subformula of C or 
a positive subf>rmula of D, or A = C -+ D and B is a positive subform$a of D. This 
prevents critical cases such as the one involved in the above formula Z. 
We will be no longer faced with maximal constructive logics which do not contain 
ST and do not contain AST, i.e., maximal constructive logics whose,fragments in the 
variable p ure not maximal sets q[formulas with the disjunction property. In Section 1.6 
we have illustrated our method to single out maximal constructive logics by providing 
examples of maximal constructive logics extending ST; in the next section we will give 
a further illustration of the method by showing a maximal constructive logic extend- 
ing AST. 
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4. A maximal constructive logic extending AST 
In this section we will present a maximal constructive pseudologic (see Section 1.6) 
extending AST, which is, at the same time, a maximal nonstandard constructive logic. 
This will allow us to define the Kripke frames semantics of an “antiscottian” maximal 
(standard) constructive logic, along the lines explained in the Section I.6 for some 
“scottian” logics, even if here we will use the selective models technique with nega- 
tively complete filtration formulas in place of the quotient models technique with 
extensively complete filtration formulas. To do so, first of all we introduce the 
following axiom-schemes: 
-(U,): (1A +lBvlC)A(lB ~lAVlC)A(lC -+lAVlB) + 
l(~Al~AlC)Vl(l~A~AlC)Vl(1~Al~AC); 
-(u,): ((A +BVCVl(lDAE)) +AVBVC)A((B +z‘iVCVl(l~AF)) 
+ftV~VC)A((C+z’iV~)-+z‘iV~VC)A(l~+l~Vl~) 
-+AvBvC; 
-(U,,,): (-JA +lB1 v ... VT&,,) +Cv(C -+(lA *lB~)v *.. v 
(1A +1&J), with m 2 2. 
Using the axiom schemes (U,), (u,) and (U,,,), we define the logic CAST (i.e., 
completed AST) in the following way: 
CAST = AST + {(U,),(U,))UU,.~((U~,~)>. 
To provide the Kripke frames semantics of CAST, we define 9&sT to be the class of 
all the (finite) posets P = (P, <) satisfying the following conditions: 
(1) PE%sT; 
(2) for every CI EP and every +I, &, & such that {41, &, &} c Fin(a) and 41, 4~ 
and & are distinct, there is p E P such that c( < /? and either Fin@) = ($1, $2) or 
Fin(P) = (41, fi)~f or Fin(B) = {&, &t; 
(3) for every CI E P with at least three distinct immediate successors and for every 
distinct $1 and & such that {&, 42} G Fin@), there is p E P such that CI ,< /? and 
Fin(B) = {& d+>; 
(4) for every m > 2, for every c(, /? E P such that b is an immediate successor of cc and 
for every distinct $1, . . . ,& such that {&, . . . ,q$,,} c Fin(P), there is y E P such that 
CI d y and Fin(y) = {I$,, . . . ,@,,,I. 
The following proposition holds: 
Proposition 14. CAST G _Y(Y&,sT). 
Proof. Since 9cAST G PAST, AST E 9(F cAST). Thus, we have only to prove that the 
axiom schemas (VI), (U,) and (U,,,) are included in 9(9&). 
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As for (Vi), assume that there is K = (P, <, Ii- ) together with a EP and wff’s 
A, B and C such that P = (P, <) eYCAST and the following conditions are 
satisfied: 
(i) XII-1A +lBvlC, aItlB +-rAvlC and alt 1C -+lAvlB; 
(ii) crl~~(Ar\~B~~C),cclp(~(~A~B~~C)andcrl~~(~A~~B~C). 
From (ii) we get that there are &, & and & such that {$,, &, &} c Fin(a), 
~,~~~Al~Al~,~~~tl~A~Al~and~,~tl~Al~A~.~ince~~,~~and~3 
turn out to be distinct, by Condition (2) of the definition of PcAsT there is /3 > c( such 
that either Fin(P) = {41, &}, or Fin(b) = {#1, &}, or Fin(b) = {&, &}. It follows 
that either fl If 1 C ~iAviB,or~Ib(iB-,~AviC,or~l~~A-*~Bv~C. 
Since x d /?, this contradicts (i). 
As for for (U,), assume that there is K = (P, <, IF ) together with CI E P and an 
instance H =((A +BvCV-I(TDAE)) +AvBvC)r\((B -~AvCvl(lDr\F)) 
+AV~VC)A((C -+AVB) +AVBVC)A(lD -*l,??V-lF) -,AVBVC Of (u,) 
such that P = (P, <) E YcAsT and a Iv H. We can assume, without loss of generality, 
that a forces the antecedent 2 of H and does not force A v B v C; thus, we have: 
(iii) !Xlk(A -+BVCVl(l~AE))-+AVBVC; 
(iv) aI~(B+AvCvi(~Dr\F))+AvBvC; 
(v) aIt(C+AvB)+AvBvC; 
(vi) aItiD +iEviF; 
(vii) a Iv A v B v C. 
Since H = Z + A v B v C is a classical tautology, all the final states of P must force 
A v B v C. Hence, since P is finite, we can assume, without loss of generality, that the 
following condition is satisfied: 
(viii) for every immediate successor a’ of a, either a’ Ik A or a’ II- B or a’ It C. 
From (iii), (vii) and (viii) it follows that there is an immediate successor a1 of a and 
a final state 41 ~Fin(ai) such that a1 Ik A, al Iv B, a1 If C and @1 IF 1 DA E. Likewise, 
from (iv), (vii) and (viii) it follows that there is an immediate successor a2 of a and 
a final state & E Fin(az) such that a2 Ik B, a2 lr A, a2 If C and 42 IF 1 D A F. Also, from 
(v), (vii) and (viii) it follows that there is an immediate successor a3 of a such that 
a3 Ik C, cc3 Iv A and a3 If B. These facts imply that a1 # a2, a1 # a3, a2 # c13, 
{41, 42) E Fin(a) and 41 # 42 (by (vi)). Thus, by Condition (3) of the definition of 
9cAST, there is /I EP such that a < ,!? and Fin@) = {&, $2). By the properties of q51 
and #Jo, we also have that /I It 1 D, which implies, by (vi), /I It 1 E v 1 F. The latter 
fact contradicts the circumstance that $1 It- E and 4~~ It F. 
As for ( U3,,,), assume that there is K = (P, Q, It ) together with a E P, A, B1, . . . ,B, 
and C such that P = (P, <) l FcAST and the following conditions are satisfied (for 
some m > 2): 
(ix) al!-1A +lBIv 9.. v-IB,; 
(4 a Y C; 
(xi) a lr C -+(-IA +iB,)v ... v(iA +iB,). 
From (xi) it follows that there is j? > a such that: 
(xii) fi Ik C, fl If 1 A -+ 1 B1, . . . ,fi Iv 1 A + 1 B,. 
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From (x) and (xii) we get that G( # ,8; also, since P is finite, we can assume, without 
loss of generality, that the following condition holds: 
(xiii) fl is an immediate successor of a. 
Finally, from (xii) it follows that there are 4 i, . . ,$, (not necessarily distinct) such 
that {+i, . ...&,,} c Fin(p) and the following condition holds: 
(xiv) for every i with 1 < i < m, pi It 1 A and & It Bi. 
Now, by Condition (4) of the definition of 8 cAsT, the above implies the existence of 
YEP such that a 6; and Fin(y) = (41r . . ,$,}. Since it turns out that y Itl.4, 
Condition (ix) immediately yields 1’ Ik 1 B, v ... v 1 B,. This contradicts 
Condition (xiv). 0 
Now we can prove: 
Theorem 3. Let L be any ~onst~ndurd logic such that CAST E L, let r be a 
L-suturated set and let W be negatively complete. Then GF?~(~)~~“/ W is built on a poset of 
.FUST. 
Proof. Since AST E L, by Theorem 1 we have that %?L(r)fi”/ W is built on a poset of 
FAST. Thus, we have only to prove that the underlying poset of %L(Z)fin/ W satisfies 
Conditions (2))(4) of the definition of 9,cAST. To do so, assume the contrary. We have 
three cases. 
Case 1. Condition (2) of the definition of 9cAST is not satisfied. 
In this hypothesis, there are states A *, @F, @z and @: such that @r, @z and @: are 
distinct and the following conditions hold: 
(I) {@t, @z, @:} c Fin(d*); 
(II) for every O* such that A* <’ 0 *, Fin(O*) # {@f, @z}, Fin(O*) # {@T, @IF} 
and Fin(O*) # {@z, @):$, where 6’ is the ordering of the underlying poset of 
%7LJ-)fi”/ w. 
Since @y, @: and @T are distinct, as usual we can choose wff’s A, B and C of 
Sf, , +,,(W) satisfying the following properties, where Il-’ indicates the forcing of the 
model %?L(r)fi”/ W: 
(III) @y It- ’ A, @y IF’1 B and @y IF’1 C; 
(IV) @It’? A, @i: It’B and @z Ik’?C; 
(V) @z It’?& @ 11’1 B and @)is k C; 
(VI) for every Y* of %L(r)fin/ W such that Y* EFin(A*)-{@T, @i:, @z}, Y* It’ A, 
Y* Ik’B and Y* IE’C. 
Now, starting from the above points (I)-(VI), it is not difficult to prove that 
A*ll-‘(iA ~iBviC)A(iB~-iAviC)r\(iC~lAviB). Since W is 
negatively complete, it turns out that the formula (1 A -+-IB vlC) A 
(i B + i A vi C) A (i C + i A v 1 B) is intuitionistically equivalent to a formula 
of Sf ,, , +,7 (W). Hence, denoting It the forcing of wL(r), by Proposition 6 we have that 
A*lt(lA +r~l?v~C)r\(~B -+iAviC)r\(iC +iAviB).BeingCAST G L, 
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we therefore have that d*I~i(Ar\iBr\iC)vi(iAr\B~iC)vi(iAr\iB~C) 
(in EL(r)). By Proposition 6, the latter fact is easily seen to contradict the above 
Points (III)-(V). Thus, Case 1 cannot hold. 
Casr 2. Condition (3) of the definition of 9cAST is not satisfied. 
In this hypothesis, in %l.(r)fi”/ W there are states d *, @t and @z such that the 
following conditions are satisfied: 
(VII) @T # @; 
(VIII) Fin(d*) 2 {@, @z}; 
(IX) d* has at least three distinct immediate successors in %‘L(r)fi”/ W; 
(X) for every state O* such that d * 6’ O*, we have Fin(O*) # {@T, @z}. 
Let Zy, . . . ,C,* (with n b 3) be all the distinct immediate successors of d* in 
Mr_(T)fi”,l w, and let @T, . . ..@z be all the final states such that 
Fin(d*) = (@y, @,T}u{@g, .. ,@i} ( w ere, of course, m 2 3 and @T, @T, @z, . ,@i are h 
all distinct). Since, as shown in Case 1, the underlying poset of %‘L(r)fi”/ W must 
satisfy Condition (2) of the definition of 9 cAST, it is not the case that all the immediate 
successors Z* , , . . . ,C,* of d * are l-states (one of these immediate successors is followed 
by @y and @z, or by @T and diz, or by @T and Q’s). Moreover, at most one of the final 
states @y, . . ,@z2 is an immediate successor of d * (i.e., it coincides with one of 
CT. . ,I,*). For, suppose that @,* and @z are immediate successors of A*, with a # h 
and 1 d a, b < m; let @,* be such that a # c, b # c and 1 d c d m. Since, as seen above, 
the underlying poset of %L(r)fi”/ W satisfies Condition (2) of the definition of 9cAsT, 
in %?,(r)““/W there is O* such that A* <’ O*, and either Fin(O*) = (@f, @lJ or 
Fin(O*) = {@f, @T} or Fin(O*) = {@, @}. I n any case, one of @,* and @z cannot be 
an immediate successor of A*. 
The above implies that there are two distinct immediate successors CT and Cy, with 
i #j and 1 B i, j < n, such that Z:* 6’ @y and 17 6’ @z. As a matter of fact, other- 
wise, there would be an immediate successor Cc of A* (with 1 < k 6 n) such that 
1: <’ @T, C,* 6’ @z and, for every immediate successor E* of A* such that C,* # 9, 
3* 6’ @T does not hold and E* 6’ @T does not hold. Since A* has at least three 
distinct immediate successors and at most one of these is final, there is C,* (with 
1 < h < n) such that 1: is an immediate successor of A*, ,?I,* # C: and C,* is not final. 
Since the underlying poset of Gk‘L(T)fi”/W belongs to FAST, we must have 
Fin(C,*) = Fin(C:). Thus, C,* turns out to be an immediate successor E* of A* such 
that E* # C,* and, e.g., E* 6’ @y; this is a contradiction. 
We can therefore assume, without loss of generality: 
(XI) 2Yy 6’ @T and Zz <’ @:. 
Now, according to the usual lines, we can single out wff’s A, B, C3,. . . ,C, of 
Sf,.-.7(W) satisfying the following conditions (where It’ is the forcing of 
%L(r)fi”/ W): 
(XII) Zy 11’ A, Zy IY’B and, for every j with 3 <j 6 n, ET If’ Cj; 
(XIII) Cz If’ A, CT Ik’B and, for every j with 3 d j < n, ZT Iv’ Cj; 
(XIV) for every i with 3 < i d n, CT If’ A, Cr l~‘B, Cr lb’ CL and, for every j with 
3 <j d n and i #j, ZF If’ Cj. 
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We can also single out w.f.f.‘s lD, 1 E and 1 F of Sf,, ,,,(O) such that: 
(XV) @T It’lD, @i: If’1 E and @T 11’1 F; 
(XVI) @T It’lD, 4: 11’1 E and @z If’1 F; 
(XVII) for every i with 3 < i 6 m, @F Ir’lD. 
Finally, we set: 
(XVIII) c = c3 v ... v C”. 
Starting from the above facts and positions, we can prove: 
(i) A*I~(A+BvCV~(~DAE))+AVBVC(~~%?~(~)). 
As a matter of fact, let A’ be any state of V,(T) such that A* < A’ ( d the ordering 
relation of gL(r)) and A’ It A -+ B v C v ~(1 D A E). Then A’ fw A*. For, from the 
above points we get C: Il- A, 1: ly B, Cy Iv C 3,...,C~l~Cn and _Z~lb(l(~Dr,E) 
(since ZT <‘@T); thus, since A’ =w A* implies A* tW A’, from the assumption 
A’=,A* we get A’lr A+BvCvl(iDr\E), a contradiction. But At&A* im- 
plies that there is i, with 1 < i d n, such that Z, cw A’; since C? k A v B v C holds by 
the above definition of A, B and C, we get A’ It A v B v C, which proves (i). 
In a similar way, we can prove the following facts: 
(ii) A*I~(B+AvCV~(~DAF))+AVBVC; 
(iii) A*It(C-+AvB)+AvBvC. 
It remains to show: 
(iv) A*ItiD -rlEv-~F. 
To prove (iv), first of all we show that A* Ik’lD + 1 E VT F (in %,(r)““/kV). 
Assume the contrary. Then there is an element O* of %‘L(T)fi”/W such that A* <” O*, 
@*II-ID, O*lfiE and @*IV-IF. By definition of lD, we have 
Fin(O*) E {@f, @g}. Since Fin(O*) = (@T} implies O* It -IF and Fin(O*) = {@T} 
implies O* It 1 E, we have therefore that Fin(O*) = {@T, @z}, which contradicts (X). 
Thus, A*lt’iD +iEvlF, q.e.d. 
Now, since W is negatively complete, we can assume, without loss of generality, 
that 1EvlFESf ,,,_,,(W), which implies 1D +iEviFESf.,,,,(W). Thus, 
from Proposition 6, we immediately get A* It 1 D -+ 1 E v 1 F, as required. 
Thus, (iv) holds. From (i)-(iv), and from the fact that A* is a L-saturated set for 
a L containing the.axiom schema (U,), we get A* It A v B v C. But from the latter fact and 
from the above definition of A, B and C a contradiction arises. Thus, Case 2 cannot hold. 
Case 3. Condition (4) of the definition of 9’+AsT is not satisfied. 
In this hypothesis, in ‘%L(r)fi”/ W there is m 2 2 together with distinct states A*, C*, 
@* , , . . . , @z such that the following conditions hold: 
(XIX) C* is an immediate successor of A* and Fin(C*) 2 {@y, .. . ,@z}; 
(XX) for every O* of G9L(r)fin/ W such that A* 6’0*, Fin(O*) # {@y, .. . ,@z}. 
We single out wffs 1 A,1 B1, . . . ,i B,, C of Sf,, _,7(W) such that the following 
conditions are satisfied: 
(XXI) for every Y*~Fin(d*), Y*k’iA iff Y*E{@T,...,@~}; 
(XXII) for every i with 1 < i < m, @’ It’ Bi and, for every j with 1 <j < m and i #j, 
@r 11’1 Bj; 
(XXIII) A* Iv’ C and C* It-’ C. 
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Now we want to prove that, in the canonical model %?#), 
A* IF 1 A + 1 B1 v ... v 1 B,. To do so, we preliminarily prove that 
A* lb’1 A --t 1 B1 v ... v 1 B, holds in the selective model %L(r)fi”/ W. For, let O* 
be an element of V,(T)““/ W such that A* 6’ O* and O* It’1 A. Then, by (XXI), we 
get Fin(O*) E {@:, . . . ,@z}. Since, by (XX), Fin(O*) # {@T, .. . ,@z}, there is some j, 
with 1 6 j < m, such that @$Fin(O*). Thus, Fin(O*) G (@T, . . . ,@z} - {@T}, which 
implies, by (XXII), O* It’1 Bj, hence O* It’1 B1 v ... VT B,. Thus, 
A*lt’l A +lBIv ... vlB,, as desired. 
Now, since W is negatively complete, the formula 1 A -+ 1 B1 v ... v 1 B, is 
intuitionistically equivalent to a formula of Sf,,,,,,(W). It follows that 
A*ltlA +lB1 v ... v 1 B, in the canonical model %?#). Hence, since L contains 
all the instances of the axiom-schema ( U3,,J, we get A* 11 C v 
(C -+(lA +-IB,)v ‘.. v (1 A +-I B,)) in VL(r). But the latter fact gives rise to 
a contradiction, starting from the properties of A* and C* and from the definition of 
the formulas C, 1 A and 1 B 1, . . ,i B,. Since also Case 3 cannot hold, our proof is 
concluded. 0 
From Proposition 14 and Theorem 3 we obtain that CAST = _Y($cAsr) and, since 
YcAST is easily seen to satisfy (s.d.e.p.), CAST is a constructive logic. But the logic we 
are interested in is the regular nonstandard logic E(CAST). Combining Proposition 
14 and Theorems 3 and 1.8, we get: 
Corollary 2. E(CAST) = dp,,,(&As~). 
Combining Theorem 3 and Propositions I.9 and 8, we also have: 
Corollary 3. For every nonstandard logic L such that E(CAST) E L, for every nega- 
tively complete formula W and for every L-saturated set r, %?#)““/ W is a regular 
Kripke model built on a poset of YcAST. 
Now we define the notions of m-CAST-almost-canonical state (m 2 1) and of m- 
CAST-almost-elementary state (m 2 3) of a poset P = (P, G), inductively as follows: 
(1) Every final state of P is a l-CAST-almost-canonical state of P. 
(2) Let CI EP: then a is a 2-CAST-almost-canonical state of P iff c1 is prefinal and 
IFIN( = 2. 
(3) Let c( E P and let IFIN = m, with m 2 3; we say that M is a m-CAST-almost- 
elementary state of P iff c( has exactly two immediate successors fl and 4 satisfying the 
following properties: 
- /3 is a (m-1)-CAST-almost-canonical state of P; 
- q5 is a final state of P, which we call the isolated final state of u. 
(4) Let c1 E P and let IFIN = m, with m > 3; we say that c( is a m-CAST-almost- 
canonical state of P iff a has exactly m immediate successors /Ii, . . . ,/I,,, satisfying the 
following properties: 
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_ for every i with 1 6 i d m, /Ii is a m-CAST-almost-elementary state of P; 
- for every i with 1 6 i d m, Fin(fli) = Fin(x); 
_ for every i, j with i # j and 1 6 i. ,j < m, the isolated final state of fli is different from 
the isolated final state of bj. 
Now, let P = (P, <), let z E P and let IFin = m, with m 3 1; we say that x is 
a m-CAST-cunonicti! state of P iff the following conditions are satisfied: 
(1) x is a m-CAST-almost-canonical state of P; 
(2) if .f is a nonempty set such that .f c Fin(z), h d m and h = I.Yl, then there is 
a uniqlle /I’ E P such that r 6 fl, Fin(j) = .f and fl is a h-CAST-almost-canonical state 
of P; 
(3) if m 2 3, .f is a nonempty set such that .f E Fin(m), 4 E,Y, 3 6 h 6 m and 
h = I .f 1, then there is a unique ;’ E P such that x 6 7, Fin(y) = ,Y. ‘/ is a h-CAST-almost- 
elementary state of P and 4 is the isolated final state of p. 
Finally, let P = (P, d ). let m 3 3, c( E P and /Fin( = m; we say that M is a m- 
CAST-elementarp state of P iff the following conditions are satisfied: 
(4) r is a m-CAST-almost-elementary state of P; 
(5) the nonfinal immediate successor of J is a (WI - 1)-CAST-canonical state of P. 
Thus, we can introduce the class PGAST of posets as follows: 
- ,9&r = {P = (P, < ,O)IP is finite, and there is m such that 0 is a m-CAST- 
canonical state of P or a m-CAST-elementary state of P}. 
Fig. 2 illustrates the three immediate successors 7,8 and 9 of the 3-CAST-canonical 
root 10 of a poset P E FGAST with the three final states 1,2 and 3. Notice that P has ten 
states and that the states 7,8 and 9 of Fig. 2 are 3-CAST-elementary states with the 
sarne final states 1,2 and 3. 
One immediately has: 
Proposition 15. F& c cFc,,,. 
Now, in order to show that Yreg(k r&ST) = Yzvr,,(.~cAsT) = E(CAST), we prove 
some properties of the posets of k rcAST. First of all, let P = (P, < ) E FcAST, let a E P 
and let 4 E Fin(a); we say that 4 is an isolated jinal state of LI iff 4 is an immediate 
successor of x. The following proposition holds: 
Proposition 16. Let P = (P, 6 ) E .FcAST, let a E P, and let IFin I 2 3; then there is at 
most one isolated ,finul state qf CL 
Fig. 2 
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Proof. Suppose there are two distinct isolated final states 4i and 42 of cc; let 43 be an 
element of Fin(r) such that $3 # 41 and $3 # $2. Then, according to Condition (2) of 
the definition of ~YcAsr, there is fl E P such that x G fl and either Fin(b) = {$i, $*) or 
Fin(B) = {4i, 43j or Fin@) = {&, &i. Thus, either 4, E Fin(p) or & EFin(fi), and 
one of 41 and @? is not an isolated final state of x, a contradiction. 0 
Let P = (P. < ) 15 ,FCAST, let x E P and let IFin( 3 3; we say that a is a terminal 
sfute ofP iff, for every /J such that a d /j and 2 # /I, Fin(a) # Fin(P). We have: 
Proposition 17. Jf P = (P, 6 ) E .FCCAS7.. s( E P und IFin(r)( 2 3, then x is II terminul 
state qf P $f there is an isolated ,final state qf a. 
Proof. Since /Fin(a)1 3 3. by Condition (2) of the definition of 9cAST there is an 
immediate successor of a which is not a l-state. Thus, since .F,--sT G .9&-, all the 
nonfinal immediate successors of c( have the same final states. 
Now, suppose that r is a terminal state of P without isolated final states. By the 
above discussion, it follows that all the immediate successors of M have the same final 
states. The latter fact implies that Fin(a) = Fin(b), where p is any immediate successor 
of x. Thus, r is not a terminal state of P, a contradiction. 
Conversely, suppose that there is an isolated final state 4 of x. Then 4 is an 
immediate successor of SI and, since IFin(cc)l 3 3, (41 = Fin(4) # Fin(z). Moreover, if 
/Y is an immediate successor of Y different from 4, then 4$Fin(/?), hence 
Fin(P) # Fin(z). It follows that c( is a terminal state of P. 0 
Now we prove: 
Proposition 18. Let P = (P, -S ) E FCAST and let x E P be a terminal state of P (hence. 
by dejnition, IFin(a)l 2 3). Then: 
(a) c( has exactly one nonjinal immediate successor and exactly onejnal immediate 
successor; 
(b) the nonjinal immediate successor qf a is not a terminal state of P. 
Proof. (a) From Propositions 16 and 17 we get that r has exactly one final immediate 
successor, say 4. On the other hand, since IFin(a)l 3 3, there is another immediate 
successor of r, which is not final. Now, suppose that there are two distinct nonfinal 
immediate successors pi and p2 of U. Then, c( has at least three different immediate 
successors, i.e., ,$i, bz and 4. Let, e.g., 4’ E Fin(,!Ii). Then 4 # 4’ and, by Condition (3) 
of the definition of .95cAST, there is y E P such that c( < y and Fin(f) = {&4’}. It follows 
that 4 is not an immediate successor of CI, a contradiction. 
(b) Let /I be the nonfinal immediate successor of c(, while 4 is the final immediate 
successor of c(. Suppose that ,!? is a terminal state of P. Then, by Proposition 17, there is 
an isolated final state 4’ of /3, where, of course, 4 # 4’. Also, since [Fin(fi)I 2 2 (by the 
above Point (a)), there is 4” E Fin(o) such that 4” # 4’, where, of course, I$” # 4. 
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Thus, by Condition (2) of the definition of %cAsT, there is y EP such that a < y and 
either Fin(y) = {$, 4’} or Fin(y) = (4, 4”) or Fin(y) = {$‘, 4”}. Since 6, is the iso- 
lated final state of CI, we cannot have Fin(y) = (4, 4’) or Fin(y) = ($,4”}; hence 
Fin(y) = (4’) 4”>. H owever, since 4’ is the isolated final state of /I, we cannot 
have /I < y. It follows that there is an immediate successor 6 of 0: such that 6 G y and 
6 # /I. Since 6 is not final and a is a terminal state of P, this contradicts the 
above Point (a). 0 
We also have: 
Proposition 19. Let P = (P, < ) E %CAsT, let a E P be such that [Fin(a)1 2 3 and a is not 
a terminal state of P. Then, for every immediate successor /I of a, Fin@) = Fin(a). 
Proof. By Proposition 17, no immediate successor /I of a is final. Also, since 
lFin(a)l B 3, by Condition (2) of the definition of %cAsT there is an immediate 
successor of a which is not a l-state. Since 9 cAsT E %AST, our assertion immediately 
follows. l-J 
Finally, we can prove: 
Proposition 20. Let P = (P, <) l %cAST, let a E P and let Fin(a) = {4i, . . . ,&,I, with 
m 2 3. Suppose that a is not a terminal state ofP. Thenfor every i with 1 6 i < m, there 
is fli E P satisfying the following conditions: 
(1) a < Pi; 
(2) Fin(a) = Fin@& 
(3) fli is a terminal state of P and pi is the isolated final state of pi. 
Proof. Since P is finite, there is a’ E P such that a G a’, Fin(a) = Fin(a’), a’ is not 
a terminal state of P and, for every immediate successor /I of a’, /I is a terminal state of 
P. Also, as a consequence of Proposition 19, we have that, for every immediate 
successor fl of a’, Fin(a’) = Fin@). Now, let fi be any immediate successor of a’, and let 
9i = (413 ... ,4m> - {4i>3 with 1 < i < m. We have that IYil > 2 and, by the above 
discussion, that 9i G Fin(f). Thus, by Condition (4) of the definition of %cAST, there is 
6i E P such that a’ < 6i and Fin(Gi) = $i. Let pi be an immediate successor of a’ such 
that fli < 6i. By the above discussion, we have Fin(bi) = Fin(a’) = {4,, . . . ,&,}. On 
the other hand, since pi is a terminal state of P (by definition of a’), by Proposition 17 
oneofthestates$i,...,& must be the isolated final state of fii. Since, being fit < 6i, no 
state Of $i can be the isolated final state of flip we get that 4i is the isolated final state of 
fli. Now, since a < a’, we get a < pi and our assertion follows. 0 
Now, let K = (P, <,O, IF ) and K’ = (P’, <‘,O’, IF’) be two Kripke models uch that: 
-P = (P, <,O) E%& and P’ = (P’, <‘,O’) E%&; 
- IFin(O),l = IFin(O = m; 
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_ either 0 is a terminal state of P and 0’ is a m-CAST-elementary state of P’, or 0 is not 
a terminal state of P and 0’ is a m-CAST-canonical state of P’. 
Also, let u be any nonempty set of propositional variables. We say that the 
application 8: P + P’ is a o-CAST-canonical application ofK in K’ iff d satisfies the 
following conditions: 
(i) Let 4 be a final state of P. Then a(4) is a final state of P’. 
(ii) If 4i and 42 are two different final states of P, then &(4,) # 8’(&). 
(iii) If cI E P and Fin(a), = {+} for some (single) final state 4 of P, then B(a) = a(4). 
(iv) Let a EP and let Fin(a), = {41, $,}, with 41 # &. Let CI’ be the unique 2- 
CAST-canonical state of P’ such that Fin(a$, = {&(4i), a($,)}. Then b(cc) = a’. 
(v) Let a be a terminal state of P, let Fin(a), = ($J,, . . . ,$,}, with n 2 3, and let di 
(1 < i < n) be the isolated final state of a (which exists and is unique by Proposition 
18). Let a’ be the unique n-CAST-elementary state of P’ such that 
Fin(a’),, = {&(4,), . . . ,&‘(c#J,)} and As is the isolated final state of a’. Then &(a) = a’. 
(vi) Let a be a nonterminal state of P and let Fin(a), = {&, . . ,&}, with n 2 3. Let 
a’ be the unique n-CAST-canonical state of P’ such that Fin(a’),, = 
{&#Q)? ‘.. 9 &‘(&,)}. Then S(a) = a’. 
(vii) For every a E P and every p E u, a It p (in K) iff &(a) II ‘ p (in K’). 
The following proposition is immediate: 
Proposition 21. Let K = (P, <,It ) be a regular Kripke model such that 
P = (P, 6 > E Fc‘W, and let v be any nonempty set of propositional variables. Then 
there is a Kripke model K’ = (P’, <‘, IF ‘), together with an application 8: P + P’, 
such that: 
(1) P’ = (P’, <‘) EF,& and P’ is uniquely determined up to isomorphisms; 
(2) 8 is a v-CAST-canonical application of K in K’. 
We also have: 
Proposition 22. Let K = (P, <, It ) and K’ = (P’, <, It ’ ) be two Kripke models such 
that P = (P, < > EF& and P’ = (P’, <‘> E&&. Let v be a nonempty set of 
propositional variables and let d be a v-CAST-canonical application of K in K’. Then 
8 is an open epimorphism of P in P’ such that, for every a E P and every p E v, a It p (in K) 
ifs&(a) It ‘p (in K’). 
Proof. The conservation of the forcing is obvious. 
For the remainder of the proof, one easily sees that d is a surjective application 
preserving the ordering, i.e., a < p in P implies &(a) <’ B(p) in P’. 
Now, let &(a) <’ /?‘, and let us assume the following induction hypothesis (recall 
thatPisfinite):ifada,,a#a,and~(al)~’B;,thenthereisp,EPsuchthata, <pl 
and 4(/?i) = /I;. We have to show that there is p EP such that a < /? and 4(/?) = /I’. 
If lFin(a)l = 1 or lFin(a)l = 2 our assertion easily follows (without using the induc- 
tion hypothesis). 
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Now, let IFin( 3 3. We have two cases. 
Case 1. Y is a terminal state of P. 
Here x’ = e(z) is a m-CAST-elementary state of P’, with m = IFin(x If /I’ = x’, 
then we set [j = a and we are done. Otherwise, there is an immediate successor x’, of 3’ 
such that x’, 6’ [I’; also, by Proposition 18, r has two immediate successors, i.e., an 
isolated final state 4 and a nonfinal state x1 which is not a terminal state of P. If CX; is 
final, then xi = /Y; thus, we set j = 4 and we are done. If r’, is not final, then a’, is 
a (m - l)-CAST-canonical state of P’, while IFin = m - 1. Since 2, is not a ter- 
minal state of P, we must therefore have 8(x1) = x;. Thus, an application of the 
induction hypothesis shows that there is /I E P such that s( 6 rl < ,8 and A(b) = /II’, as 
required. 
Case 2. 2 is not a terminal state of P. 
Here z’ = A(U) is a m-CAST-canonical state of P’, with m = IFin(c If /I’ = x’, we 
set /I = 3 and we are done. Otherwise, there is a’, E P’ such that r; is an immediate 
successor of M’ and ‘x’, 6’ fi’; moreover, 2; is a m-CAST-elementary state of P’. Let 
Fin(x;) = id;. . . . , &,,), and let 4;. with 1 6 i 6 m, be the isolated final state of x(;; also, 
let 4; = I for 1 <,j < WI, which, being Fin(cc’) = Fin(r;), implies that 
Fin(m) = (d,, . .$ ,,,). Now, by Proposition 20, there is pi EP such that x d Bi, pi is 
a terminal state of P, Fin(Pi) = (4,, . ,$m) and 41, is the isolated final state of pi; it 
follows that e(Bi) = r’,. Thus, by an application of the induction hypothesis, we have 
that there is /I E P such that x d b; d [j and A(P) = /I’, as required. 0 
Now, using Propositions 21 and 22, we prove: 
Theorem 4. E(CAST) = YJ9;A,-). 
Proof. Since, by Proposition 15, -FG4s1. c .pc.4sI, we have that E(CAST) = 
-I/‘,,&.=i;(‘& c JYrrp(.F;As7). 
On the other hand, let A$Y,,,(.‘icAsT), and let c be the set of variables of A. Let 
K = (P, ,<.O, IF ) be a regular Kripke model such that P = (P, <,O) E F,--ST and 
0 lb: A. Let K’ = (P’, d ‘, 0’, Ik ’ ) and R be, respectively, a regular Kripke model such 
that P’ = (P’, 6’, 0’) E .F&.I. and 8 is a u-CAST-canonical application of K in K’; by 
Proposition 21, such a K’ and 8 exist. 
Now. since, by Proposition 22,& is an open epimorphism, and since R preserves the 
forcing of the variables of A, from 0 IV A in K we get 0’ Iv’ A in K’. This implies 
A$_Y”,,,(3&,.) and concludes our proof. 0 
Remarks. (a) While the underlying posets of the quotient models g,,(r)/ =w con- 
sidered in Section I.6 for L 2 E(CEST) (or L 2 E(CESTJ) belong to Y,& (respec- 
tively, to 9,&r,,), the underlying posets of the selective models wI,(r)f’n/kV with 
L 2 E(CAST) considered in this section are not necessarily elements of 9&r (we can 
only say that their roots are m-CAST-almost-canonical or m-CAST-almost-elemen- 
tary for suitable values of )I?). 
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(b) Even if Y_,(/ r&sT) = 5!‘&.YcAST), we have not Y(s r&s7) = .le(.Fc,s,), as we 
will furtherly discuss. 
Since 5&sT (as well as .FcAsT ) is easily seen to satisfy (s.d.e.p.), we have: 
Proposition 23. E(CAST) is u nonstandard constructive logic. 
Now we prove: 
Theorem 5. E(CAST) is simultaneou.sly a maximal nonstandard constructice logic and 
u maximal constructiz?e pseudologic. 
Proof. Assume that there is a constructive pseudologic L together with a formula 
A such that E(CAST) G L, A EL but A$E(CAST). Let p,, ,p,, be all the variables of 
.4 (n 3 1). Let P,,+ , be a variable different from pl, . ,p,,. We can take an extensively 
complete formula W such that A is a subformula of W and the set %i of the variables 
of W coincides with {pl, ,p,,, pn+ 1). 
Now, both E(CAST) and L are E(CAST)-saturated sets, so we can consider the 
canonical models %‘Ecc,4s-r,(E(CAST)) and %‘E((.AST,(L); moreover. the latter model is 
built on a cone of the former. Consider the selective models +ZE,cAsT,(E(CAST))fi”/ W 
and % E(cAsT)( L)““.’ VJ; by Corollary 3, we have that both models are regular models 
built on posets of .FcAsT. Let K, = (PI, dl.Ol,lk,) and K2 = (P2, d2,02,k2) be 
respectively the model %E(CAsr,(E(CAST))fi”j W and %E(,--sT,(L)fin/ W, and let 
Pi = (P,. di,Oi) be the underlying poset of Ki, with i = 1 or i = 2. Since E(CAST) 
and 1, contain only classical tautologies, as seen in the proofs of Theorems I.14 and 
I.21 we have that the set Fin(Ol),, coincides with Fin(O& and that both sets contain 
2 ‘Ii ’ elements. i.e., an element for every classical interpretation of the variables 
PI. ...?PW Pn+l. 
Now. we can choose two regular Kripke models K’, = (PI, <;,O’,, 11; ) and 
K; = (Pi. <;,O;, 11; ), together with two applications t’1 : PI -+ P; and 
A,:P1 +p;. such that P’, = (P;, <‘,.O’,) e.FGAST. P; = (Pi, <;,O;) E.F;*~~, 
6, is a ‘! ,-CAST-canonical application of K, in K;, d2 is a 3,-CAST-canonical 
application of K2 in K;, and 6 1 and Bz are the identical applications on the set of final 
states Fin(O,),, = Fin(O,),,. Since A EL, we have that 0, IF z A in K2, which implies, by 
Propositions I.29 and 22, that 0; IF; A in K;. On the other hand, from A$E(CAST) we 
get 0, If 1 A, which implies, by Propositions I.29 and 22, that O’, If ‘i A. Thus, we cannot 
have that both O’, and 0; are 2”+ ’ -CAST-canonical states (of P’, and Pi respectively) 
or both 0; and 0; are 2”+ ’ -CAST-elementary states (of P’, and Pi respectively ). As 
a matter of fact, otherwise the two models K’, and K; turn out to be isomorphic (i.e.. 
they are regular models with the same final states and the same forcing on the final 
states for the variables of Y$, while the underlying posets coincide up to a renaming 
of the states); this implies 0; II-‘, A in K1 iff 0; It; A in K2, a contradiction. Thus, either 
O’, is a 2”+ ‘- CAST-canonical state of P’, and 0; is a 2”’ ‘-CAST-elementary state of 
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Pi, or 0; is a 2”+’ -CAST-elementary state of Pi and 0; is a 2”+‘-CAST-canonical 
state of P;. If 0; is a 2”+’ -CAST-canonical state of Pi, then there is a state a of 
Pi such that 0; <; CI, a is a 2”’ ’ -CAST-elementary state of Pi and CI has the same 
isolated final state as 0;. Since a It-; A in K;, and since 0; is a 2”+ ‘-CAST-elementary 
state of Pi such that 0; and CI (in the respective models) have the same final states, the 
same isolated final state and the same forcing on the variables of VW, we get 0; It; A, 
a contradiction. Thus, 0; is a 2”+’ -CAST-canonical state of Pi and 0; is a 2”+‘- 
CAST-elementary state of Pi. Without loss of generality, we can therefore assume 
that 0; is a state of Pi and that Pi coincides with the cone generated by 0; in Pi; this 
implies that K; is a submodel of K’, and that It; is a restriction of the forcing 11;. 
Now, whichever the isolated final state of 0; may be, since 0; is followed by 2”+’ 
final states, in K; one can choose 2” final states $i, . ,&n and a state fl satisfying the 
following conditions: 
(i) 0; <; fi, Fin@) = {4,, . . . ,&} and /? is a 2”-CAST-canonical state of P;; 
(ii) for every classical interpretation I, there is i, with 1 < i < 2”, such that, for every 
j with 1 <j 6 n, di It-; pj iff Z(pj) = T (recall that pl,. . . ,pn are all the variables of A). 
Since 0; <‘i /l and 0; It; A (as seen above), we have that /I It; A. On the other hand, 
according to the above, we have 0; If; A. Then, we obtain a contradiction from the 
following fact: 
(I) for every y E P’, such that y 9; /3, y IF; A. 
To prove (I) and to conclude the proof of our theorem, let u = {pI, . . . ,p,}, and let 
4 and qi’ be two final states of K;. We say that 4 and 4’ are v-equivalent in K;, and 
write 4 =, 4’, iff, for every p E v, 4 IF; p iff $’ It; p. Also, let 9 and 9’ be two nonempty 
subsets of final states of K; such that 3’ c S; we say that 9’ is a o-reduction of9 in 
K; iff the following conditions are satisfied: 
(iii) for every 4 ~9, there is $’ E 4’ such that 4 eV 4’; 
(iv) for any two 41 and & such that {&, &} z 9’ and $i # &, $i q & does 
not hold. 
Finally, let 6 EP;, 6’ EP’,, h = IFin(G)I, h’ = IFin(G’)I, and let Fin(G’) be a v- 
reduction of Fin(G) in K;. We say that 6’ is a v-contraction 018 in K; iff one of the 
following conditions is satisfied: 
(v) 6 is a h-CAST-canonical state of Pi and 6’ is a M-CAST-canonical state of Pi; 
(vi) 6 is a h-CAST-elementary state of P’, whose isolated final state does not belong 
to Fin(#), and 6’ is a K-CAST-canonical state of Pi; 
(vii) 6 is a h-CAST-elementary state of P’,, the isolated final state 4 of 6 belongs to 
Fin(X), and 6’ is a K-CAST-elementary state of Pi whose isolated final state coincides 
with 4. 
Now, we can prove the following fact, which immediately implies (I): 
(II) Let 6 E Pi and 6’ E P; be such that 6’ is a u-contraction of 6 in K;. Then, for 
every formula B containing only variables of v, 6 It; B iff 6’ 11; B. 
Note that if 6’ is a u-contraction of 6 in K; and if d6 and da, are the depths in Pi of 
6 and 8, respectively, then dg, G dh. Thus, we prove (II) by induction on dg. 
The basis is immediate, since, for d6 = 1, 6 and 6’ are final and coincide. 
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To prove the induction step, we introduce an auxiliary induction on the complexity 
of the formula B. The basis of the second induction, as well as the cases B = C A D and 
B = C v D are immediate. To treat the case B = C + D, we distinguish three cases. 
Let 6 be a h-CAST-canonical state of P; and 6’ be a h’-CAST-canonical state of P’, 
Then 6 <; 6’, hence 6 Ik; B implies 6’ II-‘, B. Conversely, suppose that 6’ 11; B but 
6 If; B. Then we cannot have 6 lb; C and 6 If; D, since, by the auxiliary induction 
hypothesis, we would have 6’Ik; C and 6’ If; D, a contradiction. Thus, there is an 
immediate successor Eof 6 in P’, such that E If; B. Since 6 is a h-CAST-canonical state 
of Pi, E is a h-CAST-elementary state of Pi, and we have two possible subcases, 
according to whether the isolated final state of E belongs to Fin(G’) or not. If the 
isolated final state of e does not belong to Fin(G), then 6’ is a u-contraction of a (in K;) 
and, by the main induction hypothesis, we have that 6’ Iv; B, a contradiction. Thus, 
the isolated final state of E is an element of Fin(G’). In this case, if h’ d 2 then it is easy 
to show that 6’ It; B iff E Ik; B (the proof, whose details are left to the reader, is based 
on the following points, e.g. for h’ = 2 and h’ < h: (a) all the final elements of the 
nonfinal immediate successor y of E are v-equivalent o one of them, say 4, which is 
also a final element of 6’; (b) since K’, is regular, it turns out that for the variables of 
v the forcing on q coincides with the forcing on 4, hence q IF; H iff 4 IF; H for every 
H containing only variables of u). We assume therefore that h’ > 2, which implies that 
all the immediate successors of 6’ are U-CAST-elementary states of P;. Let a’ be 
a k’-CAST-elementary state of Pi such that 6’ <; a’ and the isolated final state of E’ 
coincides with the isolated final state of c. Since a’ is a u-contraction of E in K;, by the 
main induction hypothesis we have that E’ If; B. But, since 6’ <; E’ and 6’ IF’, B, we 
must have E’ It-; B, a contradiction. 
Let 6 be a h-CAST-elementary state ofP; whose isolated final state does not belong 
to Fin(G’), and let 6’ be a K-CAST-canonical state of Pi. Then 6 <; 6’, so 6 It; B 
implies 6’11; B. On the other hand, suppose that 6’k’, B, but 6 Iv; B. Then, by the 
auxiliary induction hypothesis, we cannot have 6 IFi C and 6 ly; D. Hence there is an 
immediate successor Eof 6 such that E Iv ‘, B. If c = 4 is the isolated final state of 6, then 
there is 4’ E Fin(G) - {$} such that 4’ -U 4. Hence, we can assume, without loss of 
generality, that E is the nonfinal immediate successor of 6. It follows that E is 
a (h - 1)-CAST-canonical state of Pi and that 6’ is a u-contraction of E in K’, . Hence, 
by the main induction hypothesis, 6’ Iv; B, a contradiction. 
Finally, let 6 be a h-CAST-elementary state of Pi whose isolated final state belongs 
to Fin(G), and let 6’ be a V-CAST-elementary state of Pi whose isolated final state 
coincides with the isolated final state of 6 (note that, in this case, we have not 6 6 ‘i 6’). 
Suppose that 6’ IF’, B, but S Iv; B. Then, since, as seen above, we cannot have 6 It; C 
and 6 Iv; D (by the auxiliary induction hypothesis), there is an immediate successor 
E of 6 such that E IF ‘, B. Since F cannot be a final state of P’, (otherwise, Ewould be also 
an immediate successor of 6’), e must be a (h - 1)-CAST-canonical state of Pi. Also, 
the nonfinal immediate successor E‘ of 6’ is a (h’ - 1)-CAST-canonical state of Pi and 
turns out to be a v-contraction of E in K’, . By the main induction hypothesis, it turns 
out that E’ ly; B, which contradicts 6’ <; E’ and 6’ II-; B. Conversely, assume that 
148 M. Ferrari, P. Migiioli I Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 76 (I 995) I I7- 168 
6 It; B and that 6’ ly; B. Arguing as above, one has that the nonfinal immediate 
successor E’ of 6’ is a (h’ - 1)-CAST-canonical state of P; and that E’ ly; B. Also, the 
nonfinal immediate successor Eof 6 is a (h - I)-CAST-canonical state of Pi, and E’ is 
a u-contraction of s in K', . By the main induction hypothesis, we therefore have E If; B, 
which, being 6 <‘i c, contradicts 6 It’, B. 
The case B = 1 C can be treated as the case B = C --f D. 
This concludes the proof of (II), and thus the proof of our theorem. 0 
From Theorems I.5 and 5 we immediately get: 
Corollary 4. S(E(CAST)) is a maximal constructive logic. 
Now, in order to show that S(E(CAST)) coincides with 2?(@&), we show that 
.2?(9&) is neg.sat.-determined. To do so, first of all we prove the following proposi- 
tion: 
Proposition 24. Let P = (P, <,O) E.E&, and let Fin(O) = {$i, . . . ,&) (h 2 1). Let 
m 3 1 be such that h 6 2”, and let pl, . . . ,p,,, be distinct propositional variables. Then 
there is a forcing It on thejnal states of P, together with h distinct classical interpreta- 
tions 1 1, . . ,I,, of the variables pl, . . . ,p,,,, such that the following conditions are satisfied: 
(1) For every i with 1 6 i < m and euery j with 1 d j < h, 4j It pi if Zj(pi) = T and 
UJj 1~ lpi if Zj(pi) = F. 
(2) For every SI EP there is a negatively saturated formula H, containing only 
variables of {p 1, . . . ,p,} such that, for every Kripke model K = (P, 6,0, It’ ) built on 
P whose forcing II’ coincides with IF on the final states for pl,. . . ,pn, the following 
properties hold: 
(2,) SI It-’ H,; 
(24 for every p E P such that c( < fi does not hold, f3 If’ H,. 
Proof. Choose h different classical interpretations II, . . ,Ih of the variables pl, . . ,pm 
and define a related forcing Ik in such a way that Condition (1) is satisfied. Associate, 
with every final state $j (1 <j 6 h), the formula H, so defined: H,, = p1 A ... A pm, 
where, for 1 < i < m, pi = pi if $j Il- pi, and fii = 1 pi if 4j Ik 1 pi. Associate, with every 
nonempty subset .a = {&,, . . ,&,,} of {$i, . ,c#Q,}, the negatively saturated formula 
H, = ~T(H,++,,~ v ... v H$J. 
Now, let ‘2 EP be a r-CAST-canonical state of P (with 1 d r < h). We set 
H, = Hrin(a). Let K = (P, d, 0, It’) be built on P in such a way that Ik and It-’ coincide 
on the final states for p I, . . . ,p,,,. We have that GL Ik’ H,, as one immediately sees. Let 
fi E P be such that c( f p does not hold. Then, since o! is a r-CAST-canonical state of P, 
we cannot have Fin(p) E Fin(a), hence there is 4 ~Fin(fi) such that 4$Fin(cl). Since 
$lk’-~H,, we have that Ply’H,. 
On the other hand, let c( be a s-CAST-elementary state of P (with 3 < s < h). Let 
q and $j (with 1 <j Q h) be, respectively, the nonfinal immediate successor of CI and 
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the isolated final state of to (recall that q is a (s-1)-CAST-canonical state of P). Let 
,a,, . ,.a, be all the distinct subsets of Fin(a) containing exactly s - 1 elements. Let 
Xi, . . . ,A?* be all the distinct proper subsets of Fin(a) containing at least two elements, 
one of which is $j. Let, for 1 < u < h, &?‘, = Cx; - {$j}. We set H, to be the negatively 
saturated wff Hrin(z)A(Hf, v .'. v H, +Hq VH{~,I)A(H+Y, + &+I "H{+,,)A .'. A 
WR!, + H.,, v HI,,;), where, being q a (s-1)-CAST-canonical state of P, we have, 
according to the above, H, = HFin(,l). Let K = (P, d ,O, IF’) be any Kripke model 
built on P whose forcing It’ coincides with It on the final states for pl, ,p,,,. First of 
all, we show that a It’ H,. For, x Ik’ HFin(l); moreover, since M If’ HI,, . . . ,c( Iv' H,Iz,, and 
since ylk’ H, or ylk’ Ho,; for every immediate successor y of cc, we have 
xl!-’ H.,, v ... v HI,, + H, vH;,,;; finally, if a d 6 and 6 IF’ H x, (with 1 d z d b), then, 
since Fin(G) is properly contained in Fin(&) and the isolated final state of CI is ~j, either 
6 = 4jy in which case 6 IF’ HI,,; and hence 6 11’ H,; v HI,,;, or $j$Fin(G), in which case 
6lt'H,_ and hence 61k'H,cv HI,,;; thus, CI t’ H,, as required. Now, let E E P be such 
that Y d F does not hold. Then either Fin(s) G Fin(E) does not hold, or 
~j E Fin(e) E F’ ( ) m a an d I: is a t-CAST-elementary state of P (with 3 6 t 6 s) whose 
isolated final state is different from dj, or ~j E Fin(s) G Fin(a) and E is a t-CAST- 
canonical state of P (with t = 2 or 3 d t d s), or Fin(a) is properly contained in Fin(a) 
and E is a t-CAST-elementary state of P (with 3 6 t 6 s) whose isolated final state 
coincides with the isolated final state ~j of a. If Fin(e) is not included in Fin(a), then 
E ly'HFin(1), which implies, a fortiori, E l/‘H,. If E is a t-CAST-elementary state of 
P (with 3 d t d s) whose isolated final state is different from ~j and 
4j E Fin(a) G Fin(u), then the nonfinal immediate successor E’ of E is such that Fin(e’) 
is not included in Fin(q); since Fin(s’) is included in Fin(a), we have that Fin(s’) c .l,u 
for some 1 d H, d a, which implies that ~‘lt’ H,, v ... v H,"; since Fin@‘) is not 
included in Fin(q), we have E’ IV’H, and, since IFin( # 1 (recall that t 3 3), 
E’ If’Hl,,i; it follows that E If’H,, v ... v Hfc, + H, v HI,,;, a fortiori E I~'H,. If 
/Fin(s)\ >, 3, Fin(e) s Fin(z) and E is a t-CAST-canonical state of P (with t d s), then 
there is E’ E P such that E’ is an immediate successor of s and E’ is a t-CAST-elementary 
state of P whose isolated final state is different from the isolated final state of cc; thus, as 
shown in the previous case, E’ IV'H,, a fortiori E IV'H,. Finally, suppose that either 
jFin(&)( = 2 (in which case E is a 2-CAST-canonical state of P) with 
$j E Fin(a) c Fin(a) or E is a r-CAST-elementary state of P (with 3 < t d s) such that 
Fin(e) is properly contained in Fin(u) and the isolated final state of s coincides with dj; 
then, since IFin( 3 2 and Cpj E Fin(s), there is some 1 6 x G 6 such that XX = Fin(e); 
for such a XX we have, of course, c IF’ H x ,, while E lf'H.#, (since $j E Fin(s) and 
~j~.~x) and E IV'H;,,; (since Fin(e) properly contains {~j}); it follows 
FIV’H~, +H,\vHr (,,,), which implies, a fortiori, E If’ H,. This concludes the proof of 
our proposition. 0 
Using Proposition 24, we can prove: 
Theorem 6. _P(F&) is neg. Sat.-determined. 
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Proof. Assume the contrary. Then there is a wff A such that, for every negatively 
saturated substitution (T,_, cr,,A E _fZ(F&), while A~Y(&$sr). It follows that there 
is a KripkemodelK= (P, <,O,lti) such that P= (P, <,O)~F&and OIfiA. 
Let VA be the set of propositional variables of A, let p E “& and let a E P. As in the 
proof of Theorem 1.15. we say that CI is initialfor p iff u Iti p and, for every p E P such 
that/I<zanda#p,~l~ip. 
Now, for any p E VA such that CI t i p for some a E P, let a;, . . . ,a: (k 2 1) be all the 
statesofPwhichareinitialforp. Let Fin(O) = (4i ,..., #,,},andletpr ,..., pm,Zl ,..., I,, 
and IF be as in Point (1) of Proposition 24 (where we can assume, in order to avoid 
ambiguities, that (pl, . . , pm} nVA = 8). Let K’ = (P, 6,0, It ‘) be any Kripke model 
built on P such that the forcing IF’ on the final states of P coincides with It for the 
variables pl, . . . ,pm, and let, according to Proposition 24, Hr be a negatively saturated 
formula containing only variables of (pl, . . . , pm} such that cry Ik’ HP and, for every 
p E P for which UP < ,8 does not hold, fi If’ Hr. We define the formula H, as follows: 
-H,= H;v ... vH;. 
On the other hand, if p E Yi and there is no c( E P such that c( II, p in K, we define 
H, as follows: 
_ H, = ll(pl Alps) (where p1 is the first variable of the set {pl, . . . ,p,}). 
It turns out that, in any case, H, is a negatively saturated formula. We also have: 
(i) for every p E VA, c( II1 p (in K) iff IX IF’ H, (in K’). 
Now, let r?,,(p) = H,, for every p E “JrA. With an easy induction on the complexity of 
A, we can prove: 
(ii) for every c1 E P, M It A (in K) iff ct IF’ $,,A (in K’). 
It follows that 0 lf’&,,A, hence 8,,A$Y(F&sr), a contradiction. 0 
Now, combining Theorems 4-6 with Theorem 1.9, we get: 
Corollary 5. S(E(CAST)) = 6P(&$sr). 0 
Again, our method has been successful in providing a Kripke frames semantics for 
the maximal constructive logic S(E(CAST)). The problem of giving a recursive 
axiomatization of the logic S(E(CAST)) is open, just as in the case of the logics 
S(E(CEST)) and S(E(CEST,,)) (for any n 2 2). Here we only point out that, even if 
di”,,&pcAST) = Y~eg(~&ST), it is not the case that 2(pc,s,) = 3’(&&). For in- 
stance, the following (SCHEMAA) belongs to .Z(F&), but does not belong to 
~(~c*s,): 
(SCHEMAA): (l(Ar\lB) --+~~(~AAB))A((~~A + A) -+11AvllB) 
A((llB +B) ~~~Av~~B)-~~(AA~B)v~(~AAB). 
To prove that (SCHEMAA) belongs to 6p(pc ,--sT), assume the contrary. Then, there 
are K = (P, 6, IF ) and u E P such that cx forces in K the antecedent of (SCHEMA”), 
but tl Iv 1 (A A 1 B) v ~(1 A A B). It follows, in particular, that there are b1 and I$* 
such that {d,, &} c Fin(a), 4i II- A ATB and &It 1 A A B. If Fin(a) = (4,, &}, 
M. Ferrari. P. Miglioli / Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 76 (1995) I I7- I68 151 
then, according to the definition of 9&sT, !.x is a 2-CAST-canonical state of 
P = (P, <)>, hence c( is prefinal. Since c1 If -ilA, it follows that crlk 1lA -+ A 
(likewise, we can prove that gI1llB + B); hence, since CI F (11 A -+ A) -+ 
iiAvllB (being (1lA + A) +liAvllB one of the conjuncts of the 
antecedent of (SCHEMAA)), we get alk 11Avll B, which gives rise to a con- 
tradiction. It follows that IFin( 2 3, i.e., there is & E Fin(a) such that $i # & and 
& #&. Now, either q&It AATB, or ~,I~~(Ar\~B); since crIti(A~lB)+ 
ii (1 A A B) (being 1 (A A 1 B) + ii(i A A B) one of the conjuncts of the ante- 
cedent of (SCHEMA ^)), in the latter case we have & Ik 1 A A B. Thus, either & 
behaves as $i (both 4i and & force A A 1 B) or & behaves as & (both & and & 
force 1 AA B). Assume, without loss of generality, that & behaves as 4i, i.e., 
d311- AATB. 
Now, since {&, &, &} E Fin(a), there is a’ E P such that CI 6 a’, a’ is a 3-CAST- 
elementary state of P and Fin(cr’) = {41, 42, d3}. Let fl be the nonfinal immediate 
successor of ~1’. We have two cases. 
The first case corresponds to Fin(P) = {4i, $2} or to Fin(b) = {$2, &I. Here we 
have /I Iv 11 A (and also fl If 11 B), which implies p II 11 A + A; hence, being 
~I~(~~A-+A)+~~Av~~B (since a<fi), we get PII-iiAv~lB, which 
gives rise to a contradiction. 
The second case corresponds to Fin(B) = {4r, @,}, which implies B It 1 B. Here the 
isolated final state of the 3-CAST-elementary state a’ is &, where & It 1 A A B. These 
facts imply a’ It 11 B + B, which, being a’ It (11 B + B) + 11 A v 11 B, implies 
a’lk 11 A vi1 B, which still gives rise to a contradiction. 
To prove that (SCHEMAA) does not belong to CAST = _Y(F,-AST), we have 
that the instance (i(pAiq) -il(lpAq))A((iip -p) +iipvl?q) 
r\((iiq -4) +iipviiq) -+i(pr\iq)vi(ipr\q) of (SCHEMA”) does 
not belong to CAST, as shown by the counter model of Fig. 3 which is built on a poset 
which is readily seen to belong to FcAST. 
Now, for every finite nonempty set of variables u = {pI, . . . ,p,}, let 
K, = (P, <, 0, Ik ) be a Kripke model so defined: 
- 0 is a 2”-CAST-canonical state of P = (P, <, 0); 
- for every classical interpretation I of the variables p 1, . . . ,p,,, there is a final state 4 of 
P such that the forcing IF on 4 for the variables pl, . . . ,p. coincides with I. 
Arguing as in the proof of Point (II) in the proof of Theorem 5, we can show: 
if A is any formula containing only variables of v, then 0 It A in K, i&f A E E(CAST). 
Hence: 
Theorem 7. For every jinite nonempty set v of propositional variables, E(CAST)- 
biimplication divides the set offormulas containing only variables of v into ajnite set of 
equivalence classes. 
To conclude our illustration of the “antiscottian” maximal constructive logics, we 
remark that _Y(9&,) is not the only such logic. 
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For instance, consider the logic D1 = INT + {(Di)} of Gabbay and de Jongh 
[S, 7,161, where (Di) is the axiom schema so defined: 
(01): ((A+BvC)+BVC)A((B+AvC)+AvC)A((C+AvB)-+AvB) 
-+AvBvC. 
As it is known, D1 = _Y(Ro,), where FD, is the class of all the finite posets 
P = (P, <) such that, for every M EP, CI has at most two immediate successors [16] 
(the semantics given in [8,7] for Di, using the class of the binary trees, although 
equivalent o the present one, is a particular case of it). Now, as shown in [16], we 
have: 
-for every logic L such that L z D,, for every L-saturated set r and for every wfs H, 
SYF?~(~)~~“/H is built on a poset of Fo,. 
Thus, combining this result with Theorem 1, we get: 
~ D, + AST = Y(YD, nF*sr). 
Since FD, I-&,,~~ is easily seen to satisfy (s.d.e.p.), we therefore have: 
_ D1 + AST is a constructive logic. 
On the other hand, arguing as in [16], it is not difficult to show that 2’(9&) 
and Di + AST are constructively incompatible. Thus, by Zorn’s lemma, we have: 
_ There is a maximal constructive logic including D1 + AST and diflerent from 
=%%ST). 
8. An apparently maximal, but nonmaximal constructive logic: 
the logic RH of the rhombuses 
Just as seen at the end of the previous section for the logic AST, also the logic ST 
can be combined with the logic D1 of Gabbay and de Jongh, giving rise to the 
constructive logic D1 + ST. As a matter of fact, using the results of [16] and taking 
into account a remark at the end of Section 1.5, according to which the completeness 
theorem of ST can be also proved by means of the selective models technique (i.e., 
%?L(r)fin/H is built on a poset of FsT for every nonstandard logic L, every saturated 
set r and every wff H, see also [16]), we get: 
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Proposition 25. (I) For every nonstandard logic L such that L 2 D1 + ST, for every 
L-saturated set r and for every wfs H, GTY~(Z)~~~/H is built on a poset of Pv, nY&. 
(II) D1 + ST = Y(FD, n@-sr). 
(III) PD, n9ssT satisjies (s.d.e.p.), hence D1 + ST is a constructive logic. 
Now, comparing the semantical characterization of D1 + ST with the ones of the 
“scottian” maximal constructive logics S(E(CEST)) and S(E(CEST,)) (n > 2) studied 
in Section 1.6, using the methods of [16] it is not difficult to prove that D1 + ST is 
constructively incompatible with these logics. Hence, all the maximal constructive 
extensions of D1 + ST are “scottian” maximal constructive logics different from the 
ones of Section 1.6. 
In [ 131 a constructive logic including D, + ST has been presented, in order to show 
that D1 is not a maximal constructive logic (as a matter of fact, ST is not included in 
Dl). This logic has been given in pure semantical terms, as the logic generated by 
a suitable class of posets; e.g., the poset of Fig. 4 with five final states provides a good 
representation of the structure of all the posets of the class (with an arbitrary, but finite 
number of final states). 
As suggested by Fig. 4, we call posets with rhombuses the considered posets, and 
represent by FRH the class of all them. The related logic, i.e., the logic .Y(Pr& will be 
called the logic of the rhombuses and will be denoted by RH. Thus, we have: 
Proposition 26. (I) RH = LZ(YRH) (by dejnition of RH). 
(II) D1 + ST G RH (as stated in [13], and as one easily sees looking at 9v, ~~9s~). 
(III) RH is a constructive logic (as stated in [13], since PRH is easily seen to satisfy 
(s.d.e.p.)). 
Now, for the great regularity of the posets of FRH and the impossibility of restricting 
in a relevant way Piur into a narrower class of posets preserving (s.d.e.p.), it is worth 
investigating whether RH is a maximal constructive logic or not (if 9 E 9s” and 
there is n >, 1 such that all the elements of B have at most n final states, then Y(9) is 
not constructive’ if 9’ G g and, for every n 3 1, there is an element of 9’ with at 
least n final states, then P’(F) = P’(&n) = RH, as one easily sees). From this point 
Fig. 4 
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of view, in [3] Chagrov and Zacharyashchev present RH as a natural “candidate” to 
be proved to be maximal; probably, this was also the feeling of Maksimova when she 
introduced RH in [13]. Thus, to check the power of our method to single out maximal 
constructive logics, we have made an investigation on the maximality of RH. We want 
to discuss here the results of this research, making at the same time a comparison 
between the properties of FRH and the properties of the classes of posets characteriz- 
ing the maximal constructive logics presented in Sections I.6 and in Section 4; such 
a discussion, we believe, should provide new insights on the maximal constructive 
logics and on our method. 
First of all, we remark that, as in the case of the maximal constructive logics 
S(E(CEST)), S(E(CEST,J), and S(E(CAST)) considered in section I.6 and in the 
previous section (or, taking into account the corresponding maximal nonstandard 
logics E(CEST), E(CEST,,) and E(CAST)), the posets characterizing the logic RH (the 
nonstandard logic E(RH) = U,,,(&m)) are uniquely determined by thejnal states (up 
to isomorphisms). Also, RH is a neg.sat.-determined logic (which implies 
RH = S(E(RH)) = S(9,,,(.9&)), a necessary condition in order that RH be a maxi- 
mal constructive logic. As a matter of fact, if P = (P, d ) E 5FRH, CI E P, /3 E P and 
SI # p, then Fin(u) # Fin@): starting from this and following the ideas of the proofs of 
Theorems 1.15, I.23 and 6, one gets a particularly simple proof of the fact that RH is 
neg.sat.-determined. 
On the other hand, let us consider regular forcing and let us take into account any 
finite set u = {p 1, . . . ,p,} of propositional variables (n z 2) together with the related 
set of v-formulas (i.e., the set of formulas containing only variables of u); let us take any 
P E FRH with 2” final states, and let us associate classical interpretations (forcings) of 
the variables pl, . . . , p. with the final states of P, in such a way that different interpreta- 
tions are associated with different final states; let K be the resulting regular Kripke 
model built on P. Then, differently from the analogous cases related to the logics 
E(CEST) = dreg, E(CESTJ = ~&%sT,) and JWAST) = ~reg(~&~~) 
(see the proofs of Theorems 1.16, I.22 and 7), the model K is not unique (up to 
isomorphisms), i.e., we can build in this way different Kripke models with a different 
behaviour with respect o the u-formulas. 
For instance, let v = {p, q} and let us consider the two regular Kripke models of 
Fig. 5, built on the same poset P E FRH with four final states. 
One readily sees that, e.g., the root of Model 1 forces the formula 
~(p~q)=(pv~~((p~~q)v(~p~q))v~~((~P~q)v(1P~~q))~(P~q)v(P 
“lq)V(1PAq)“(lP”lq)) -‘(P”q)V(P~~q)“~P”q)V(~P”-‘q), while 
the root of Model 2 does not force A(p, q). More generally, for every v with at least two 
elements, there is no finite Kripke model K such that the underlying poset of K belongs 
‘to TRn and the root of K forces all the v-formulas of E(RH). In this sense, if E(RH) 
would be maximal, then E(RH) would occupy a different place than E(CEST), 
E(CESTJ and E(CAST) in our classification of the maximal nonstandard construc- 
tive logics: for, the u-formulas are divided into an infinite set of E(RH)-equivalence 
classes ( Iv1 2 2). 
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However, quite unexpectedly, Chagrov’s and Zacharyashchev’s conjecture has 
turned out to be false, i.e., RH is not a maximal constructioe logic and E(RH) is not 
a maximal nonstandard constructive logic. We are going to sketch a proof of this fact, 
which leaves open the problem of providing a maximal nonstandard constructive 
logic L dividing, for some finite u, the v-formulas into an infinite set of classes of 
L-equivalence. A short discussion concerning the possibility of finding such a logic 
among the maximal nonstandard constructive extensions of E(RH) will follow. 
To prove that RH (that E(RH)) is not a maximal constructive logic (a maximal 
nonstandard constructive logic), first of all we introduce a new class of posets, which 
properly extends .FRH, but gives rise to the same logic (i.e., to RH and to E(RH), 
according to whether we consider the standard or the nonstandard case). This will be, 
on the other hand, the tool to introduce a relevant restriction in the involved class of 
posets; for, while no subclass of 9 RH can be directly found in order to get proper 
constructive extensions of RH (of E(RH) in the nonstandard case), this can be done 
indirectly, using the generalized posets with rhombuses we are going to define. 
- We say that a finite poset P = (P, <) is a generalized poset with rhombuses iff the 
following conditions are satisfied: 
(1) PEFsT; 
(2) if tl E P and CI is not final, then o! has exactly two immediate successors (in 
particular, P E FD,); 
(3) if a E P, fi E P, c( and b are not final and a and fi have the same immediate 
successors, then ~1 = B; 
(4) for every a E P, p E P, y E P, 6 E P and E E P, if p and y are the immediate 
successors of GI, and y 6 6, and y d E, and 6 Q E does not hold, and E < 6 does not hold, 
then B d 6 or /3 d E. 
- .FoRH will indicate the class of all the generalized posets with rhombuses. 
We remark that, assuming the finiteness of P (included in the definition of the 
elements of FsT), Conditions (2) and (4) alone imply Condition (1) of the definition of 
FGRH. The proof of the following proposition is not difficult and is left to the reader; 
Point (II) requires an induction on the depth of c1 (where Conditions (2) and (4) of the 
definition of FoRH are used), Point (III) follows from Condition (2)-(4) of the 
definition of FoRH, Point (IV) immediately comes from Condition (4) of the definition 
of 9-oRH. 
Proposition 27. (I) FRH G FGRH. 
(II) Let P = (P, <) EF~~“, let do E P, fi E P, y E P and let p and y be the immediate 
successors of c(. Then the depth of fl coincides with the depth of y. 
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(III) Let P = (P, <) ~~~~~~ let CI E P, /Y? E P, y E P, let p and y be the immediate 
successors of CI and let /I and y be nonjnal. Then j3 and y have in common exactly one 
immediate successor. 
(IV) Let P = (P, <) ~~~~~~ let c( E P, fi E P, let /3 be an immediate successor of CC, 
and let IFin( = n (n >, 2). Then IFin( > n - 1. 
On the other hand, 9&u, properly contains 9 RH. Fig. 6 illustrates an element of 
B GRH which does not belong to &u. 
Now, let P = (P, <,O) E~GRH, and let n 3 1 be the depth of P, i.e., the depth of its 
root 0. Then, with every j such that n >, j >, 1, we associate a sequence Sj = cc{, . . . ,a’,, 
of states of P, where the sequence Sj may contain repetitions (i.e., M(, . . . ,cljk, are not 
necessarily pairwise distinct) and the depth of all the states of Sj is j. The definition of 
Sj is given inductively as follows, starting from n and descending the chain: 
- S, = c(y = 0 (i.e., S, contains only the root of P). 
- If n > 1, then S,_i = XT-‘, CI:-‘, where CI I-’ is an immediate successor of crl and 
CC;- ’ is the other immediate successor of MY. 
- If n > 2, then Sn_2 = x”,-~, crze2, c(;-~, where a;-’ is the immediate successor of 
LX;-’ which is not a successor of c(t- ‘, CC;-’ is the immediate successor common to 
al-’ and to al-‘, and aJm2 is the immediate successor of c&-i which is not 
a successor of IX;-‘. 
- Let n > 3, and let n - 2 2 j > 2. Suppose, inductively, that Sj is a sequence with 
possible repetitions a(, . ,&, such that kj 2 3 and, for every h with 1 < h 6 kj - 1, 
cri # a{+ 1. Suppose also that all the states of P with depth j are in Sj and that, for 
every i with 1 < i < kj - 1, a{ and a{+ I have in common exactly one immediate 
successor (in P). Then, with every a such that 1 < a < kj, we associate a sequence 
Sj_,(a) of states of P inductively as follows, where, for 1 < b < c < kj, Sj_ ,(b) is 
a subsequence of Sj_ 1(c): 
(I) Sj- 1( 1) = pi, /12, where /?i is the immediate successor of cr{ which is not a suc- 
cessor of I$, and /I2 is the immediate successor of both a{ and CX{. 
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(II) Sj_ i(2) = pi, f12, fi3, where /I3 is the immediate successor of CZ~ which is not 
a successor of cc{. 
(III) Let 2 < a d kj. Suppose inductively that the following conditions are satisfied: 
(IIIi) Sj-i(a) = pi, . . . ,bz._ i, fiz. for some z, such that u < z,; 
(1112) if j > 2 then, for every h with 1 6 b 6 z, - 1, /Ib and /$,+ 1 are states of P with 
exactly one immediate successor in common; 
(IIIJ pzU_ 1 and /3=, are the two immediate successors of cri. 
Let y and 6 be the two immediate successors of CI “,+ 1, and let y be the immediate 
successor of xi+ 1 which is also an immediate successor of CC: (then either y = bz, or 
1’ = A- 1). 
If y = pzO, we set: 
(1114) Sj-l(a+1)=B1,...,PZ,~11PZ.,6=B1,...,Br.-1,P*.,Pz,+l=Sj-l(a),B,~+1. 
If *i = /I_ 1, we set: 
(IIIS) Sj-l(a+1)=p,,...,BZ,-l,/jz,,Bz.-1,6=P1,...,Bz.-1,B*,,Bz.+l,82.+2= 
sj-l(ahBz,+l~ A.+2 (with L.-I =Bz.+~ and 6 =L.+z). 
The above Points (I)-(III) (with the Subpoints (IIIi), (III& (III& (IIIJ and (III,)) 
complete our definition of the sequences Sj-i(a), with 1 < a < kj. Having these 
sequences, we set: 
(IV) Sj_ 1 = Sj_ ,(kj). 
The sequence Sj- 1 is easily seen to satisfy all the requirements. 
The sequences Sj defined above allow us to define the top paths of the elements of 
CFoRH. To be more precise, let P = (P, d , 0) E iy rGRH, with n the depth of 0. We say 
that the sequence Si = $:, . . , $:, (defined, for j = 1, as seen above and including, 
with possible repetitions, all the final states of P), is a top path of P. 
To give an example of a top path, consider the poset illustrated by the following 
Fig. 7. Then, a top path of this poset is provided by the sequence 1,2,3, 1 of final 
states. 
For a more sophisticated example, consider the poset of the above Fig. 6; then we 
have the following sequences Sj, for 6 > j > 1: 
ss = 19; 
s5 = 17,18; 
S4 = 14, 15, 16; 
s3 = lO,ll, 12,13; 
S2 = 6,7, 8,7, 9,8; 
si = 1,2, 3,2,4,2, 3,2, 5, 2,4. 
The sequence Si = 1,2,3,2,4,2,3,2, 5,2,4 of final states is a top path of the con- 
sidered poset. 
Of course, two consecutive elements bj and ~j+ 1 of a top path 4i, . . . ,& of 
a PE9GRH (k > 1) are different, since there is a prefinal state fi of P such that 
{~j, ~j+ i} = Fin(P) and the immediate successors of any element of P must be 
different. The strict connection between the top paths and the prefinal elements of the 
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posets of FoRH corresponds to the main idea involved in the top paths, i.e., the top 
paths are a tool to define open epimorphisms from posets of %RH to posets of %GRH. 
As a matter of fact, instead of looking at a top path $r,. . . ,& as a sequence with 
possible repetitions of final states of a P E%~~~, we can look at c#J~, . . . ,& as 
a sequence of distinct and prejinally connected newjinal states (e.g., the states 1, . . . , k) in 
correspondence with the old jinal states of a given P E %GRH (e.g., with the new final 
state j the old final state ~j is associated): in this way, the new final states and the 
related prefinal states prefinally connecting them become the top part of a poset 
P’ E %RH uniquely determined by its top part. 
For instance, the top path 1,2,3,2,4,2,3,2,5,2,4 of the poset of Fig. 6 gives rise to 
the sequence of prefinally connected new final states of Fig. 8, where we indicate, for 
every new final state, the old final state corresponding to it. 
Also, the top path 1,2, 3, 1 of the poset of Fig. 7 gives rise to Fig. 9. 
Now, Fig. 8 can be completed into Fig. 10, providing a P’ E%~~ and an open 
epimorphism d of P’ in the poset P of Fig. 6; the numbers near the states of P’ indicate 
the corresponding states of P under B. 
Also, Fig. 9 can be completed into Fig. 11, providing a poset P” E %RH and an open 
epimorphism of P“ in the poset of Fig. 7. 
In the above examples it should be clear how one can complete the top parts of the 
posets and how one can associate the states of the old poset with the ones of the new 
poset. More generally, one can prove without difficulty the following proposition: 
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Proposition 28. For every P = (P, < ) E k cGRH, there is P’ = (P, 6) E&, together 
with an open epimorphism 6: P’ -+ P of P’ in P. 
From Proposition 28 we immediately get: 
Corollary 6. RH = 3(90RH) and E(RH) = 9rep(F&. 
We now are in a position to suitably restrict the class of posets 9oRH in order to 
define a constructive logic stronger than RH and a nonstandard constructive logic 
stronger than E(RH). To do so, we single out the following posets. 
_ Let P = (P, < ) be any poset, let c( E P, and let 4 E Fin(x). We say that C$ is a hinge 
for c( iff the following condition holds: 
(i) for every 4 E Fin(u) such that $ # c$‘, there is fi E P such that c( d p, p is prefinal 
and {c$J,~‘} c Fin(b). 
_ Let P = (P, < ) be any poset. We say that P is a poset with hinges iff, for every CI E P, 
there is 4 E Fin(a) such that b, is a hinge for CC 
- The notation &, will indicate the class of all the posets with hinges, while 
9 HIGRH will be 9& rSGRH. 
~ HI and HIGRH will be the (standard) logics 5Z(pHI) and 04P(~~,oRH) respectively; as 
a consequence, E(HIGRH) will coincide with Y~eg(9&&. 
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Notice that both the poset of Fig. 6 and the poset of Fig. 7 are elements of PnIGRH; 
in the poset of Fig. 6 the final state 2 is a hinge for the root 19 and for all the non- 
final states; in the poset of Fig. 7 all the final states are hinges for the root 9,2 is a 
hinge for 7,4 and $3 is a hinge for 8,6 and 5, while 1 is a hinge for 6 and 4 but not 
for 7 and for 8. 
Of course, HI c ST. Also, by definition, we have YnIGRH E FoRn, which implies, by 
Corollary 6, RH E HIGRH and E(RH) g E(HIGRH). 
To prove that HIGRH and E(HIGRH) are proper extensions of RH and E(RH) 
respectively, consider, e.g., the following axiom-schema: 
On the one hand, it is readily seen that every instance of (Sn,) belongs to HI. 
For, suppose the contrary. Then, there is K = (P, 6, IF ) together with c( E P and 
A and B such that P = (P, d ) E pHr, alt (TFIAvT~((AA~B)v(TAAB))v 
~~((~AAB)v(~AA~B))+(~~AA~~B)v(~~AA~B)v(~AA~~B)v 
(TAATB)) ~(~~AA~~B)v(~~AA~B)v(~AA~~B)v(~AA~B), but 
rl~i(A~B)~i(A~iB)~i(iA~B)~i(iAr\iB).Thelatterfactimpliesthat 
there are 4i, &, & and $4 such that {$i, &, &, 44} E Fin(a), $i It AA& 
C#I~ F A A i B, d3 II- 1 A A B and $4 11 1 A A i B. Since P E FHI, we can assume, with- 
out loss of generality, that one of 4i, $2, 4 3 and 44 is a hinge for a; as a matter of fact, 
otherwise, there is @5 EFin(cc) such that $5#(@lr &, &, 4,}, 45 is a hinge for LY, and 
either @511 AA& or 451t AAT& or ~,I~~AAB, or @,ltiA~lB; in the first 
case we can set 4; = 45 and take ($;, &, &, $4} in place of {4i, &, &, 4,>, in the 
second case we can take {41, &, &, 44} in place of {$i, &, &, 44}, and so on. Now, 
we distinguish four cases, according to whether the hinge is 4,, or $*, or &, or 44. If 
the hinge is $i, consider, e.g., a prefinal state /I such that c( < /I and Fin(P) c {4i, &}: 
we have /ll~iiA, ~I~~~((AA~B)v(~AAB)) and ~I~-IT((TAAB)v 
(1 A r\lB)); being /I prefinal, it follows that 
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a contradiction. Likewise, if the hinge is 42, we take a prefinal state /I’ such that CI < fi’ 
and Fir@‘) c {&, &>, and get the contradiction; if the hinge is &, we get the 
contradiction taking a prefinal state /?” such that a d p” and Fin(P”) = {&, &}; 
finally, if the hinge is 44, we take, e.g., a prefinal state b”’ such that CY. < fi”’ and 
Fin(P”‘) = {&, b,}, with the same result (in this case and in the case where the hinge 
is 4i, we can take also a prefinal state /+‘I” such that c( d b’” and Fin(b’“) = {4t, 44)). 
On the other hand, it is readily seen that the root of Model 1 of Fig. 5 does not force 
the instance of (Sn,) with the variable p in place of A and the variable q in place of B. 
Since Model 1 is built on a poset of YRH, we therefore have: 
Proposition 29. RH E HIGRH and RH # HIGRH; E(RH) !Z E(HIGRH) und 
E(RH) # E(HIGRH). 
Remarks. (a) The above proof that the axiom-schema (Sn,) belongs to HI involves 
only four final states of the Kripke model K. Thus, (S,,) cannot characterize the logic 
HI, which we believe is not finitely axiomatizable (the axiomatization of HI seems to 
necessarily involve infinite increasing sequences of logics whose union coincides with 
HI). 
(b) Let HIi = 9(9ni nFrIN,) for any i > 2. Then { HIi}i a Z is a strictly decreasing 
sequence of logics and one can prove that HI = ni s 2 HIi = 9 (ui b 2 (Fni nPriN,)) 
(we recall that, according the definition given above, the elements of 9ni may be 
infinite, with infinitely many final states; on the other hand, since the elements of 
*HIGRH are finite by definition, we immediately have HIGRH = 
y(ui 2 2(cqHIGRH nFFIN,))). 
The last step of the proof that RH is not a maximal constructive logic and 
E(RH) is not a maximal nonstandard constructive logic consists in showing that 
HIGRH and E(HIGRH) are constructive. To do so, one may prove that 9nioRn satis- 
fies (s.d.e.p.). 
The proof of the latter fact can be effectively carried out and is not difficult, even if 
an explanation in full detail becomes rather long and cumbersome (we have in mind to 
provide such a proof in a subsequent paper concerning RH and some of its exten- 
sions). To give here a brief sketch of the construction, given Pi = (Pi, d i) ~Ynio~n 
and PZ = (Pz, d 2) E ~HIGRH such that PI nPz = 8, one can put together PI and P2 
into a poset B E Ynio~u with PI and P2 as disjoint sets, along the following lines. 
First of all, let P = (P, <, 0) E FHIGRH. Then we say that a sequence zo, . ,a, 
(n 2 0) of states of P is a border path iff rn is final and the following conditions are 
satisfied: 
_ c(~ coincides with the root 0 of P; moreover, if n > 0, then ri is one of the immediate 
successors of aO. 
~ Suppose that 1 < j < n - 1 and that /3 and Orj are the nonfinal immediate successors 
of C(j~ 1 in P. Let y be the immediate successor of Ij which is not a successor of /I. 
Then rj+ 1 = y. 
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Let P E %IIGRH , let B = CI~, . .. ,a, be a border path of P, and let 0 < j < n - 1. Then 
we say that C(j is a starting border state ofP with respect o B iff Fin(aj) # Fin(aj+ r). 
Now, let P = (P, d, 0) E FHIGRH, and let 4 be a hinge for 0. We say that I$ is a good 
hingefor 0 iff there is a border path BJ = c(~, . .. ,a, such that the following condition is 
satisfied: 
(i) for every j such that 0 < j < n and Qj is a starting border state of P with respect 
to B, d, is a hinge for aj(in P). 
To put into evidence the border path by which q5 is a good hinge for 0, we will also 
say that $I is a good hinge with respect to 9. 
For instance, look again at the poset of Fig. 6, where Bi = 19, 17, 14, 10,6, 1 and 
Bz = 19, 18, 16, 13,8,4 are the border paths. Then, 17, 14, 10 and 6 are the starting 
border states of P with respect o B1, while 19, 16, 13 and 8 are the starting border 
states of P with respect o Bz. It turns out that 2 is a good hinge both with respect o 
B1 and with respect o BBz. 
For another example, take into account the poset of Fig. 7, where Bi = 9,7,4, 1 
and Bz = 9,8,6,1 are the border paths. Then 2 is a good hinge with respect o B1, 
while 3 is a good hinge with respect o Bz; on the other hand, even if it is a hinge for 
the root 9,1 is not a good hinge for 9. 
Now, the first step of our construction can be described as follows. Let 
p = (P, <,o> E.FH,GRH, and let 4 E Fin(O). Then, if 4 is not a good hinge for 0 
(in particular, 4 may be not even a hinge for 0), one can extend P into a 
P’ = (P’, 6’, 0’) EF&~ such that 0 EP’, Fin(O) = Fin(O’), P = Pb and $I is 
a good hinge for 0’ (Pb is the cone of 0 in P’, see Section 1.3). 
For instance, consider the poset P E F HIGRH of Fig. 12 where 1 is a good hinge for 
the root 10 and 3 is not even a hinge for 10. We can extend P into a poset P’ E FHIGRH 
as indicated in Fig. 13, where 3 is a good hinge for the root 19 (3 is a good hinge with 
respect o the border path g2 = 19, 18, 16, 14,12,2, but, of course, it is not a good 
hinge with respect o the border path .Bi = 19, 17, 10,8,5,2). 
As a second step, we make the following remark. Let P = (P, 6,O) E pHIGRH 
and let 4 be an element such that d$ P. Then one can extend P into a 
P’ = (P’, ,<‘,O’) ~~~~~~~ such that OE P’, P = Pb and Fin(0’) = Fin(O)u{$). 
Combining the above points, we get the following. Let P = (P, <,O) E FHHIGRH and 
let 4 $ P. Then we can extend P into a P’ = (P’, 6’, 0’) ~~~~~~~ such that 0 E P’, 
P = Pb, Fin(0’) = Fin(O)u{$} and q5 is a good hinge for 0’. 
10 
Fig. 12. 
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Fig. 13. 
Fig. 14. 
Now, let P = (P, <,O) e9H,GRH and P’= (P', <',O1)~FHIGRH be such that 
PnP' = 8, and let, e.g., 4 be a hinge for 0’ in P’. Then, we extend P’ into 
pace = (plfl, <'If, 0"') E FH,GRH such that 0’ E PI", P’ = Pi! and rj is a good hinge for 
the root 0”’ of P”‘; let W’ be a border path of PI” such that C$ is a good hinge with 
respect to W. Moreover, we extend P into P” = (P" , <“,O”) ~&osn such that 
0 E P", P = Pg and C#I is also a good hinge for the root 0” of P”; let 93” be a border 
path of PI’ such that 4 is a good hinge with respect o 98”. After these extensions, we 
can use C$J as a simultaneous good hinge for 0”’ (in P”‘) and for 0” (in P”); thus, by 
suitably connecting the states of 9”’ and the states of B”, we can build a poset 
@ = (p, ~7 0) E 9n,oRH as schematized in Fig. 14, where 4 is a hinge for d and the 
internal sides of the rectangle correspond to the border paths 39”’ and 93”. 
For instance, let P”’ and P” be, respectively, the left and the right poset of Fig. 15, 
where 1 is a good hinge for the roots of both posets. 
Then, one can build the poset P as shown in Fig. 16, where 1 is a hinge for the root. 
In this way, one gets (s.d.e.p.) for 9”iGRH. Thus, one has: 
Proposition 30. HIGRH is a constructive logic and E(HIGRH) is a nonstandard 
constructive logic. 
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From Propositions 29 and 30 we immediately get: 
Corollary 7. RH is not a maximal constructive logic and E(RH) is not a maximal 
nonstandard constructive logic. 
Remark. In [3] Chagrov and Zacharyaschev quote a constructive logic, say L, 
characterized by posets such as the ones of Fig. 17. They present also such a logic as 
a “candidate to maximality”. However, it is possible to show that, for every P E FKH, 
there is a poset P’ for L together with an open epimorphism 8: P’ + P of P’ in P. It 
follows that L c RH, hence L is not maximal. 
It is also possible to show that L is properly contained in RH, since the following 
axiom schema 
(S&: ((A+B)-+AvB)A((B+AvCvDv(C+D)v(D-,C))~AvB) 
A(AAC+D)A(AAD -C) -+AvB 
holds in RH but not in L ((S,,) holds in every finite poset P = (P, 6 ) such that, if 
51, p, y, 6 and E are elements of P such that fl and y are immediate successors of ~1, 
“/ d 6,~ d E, E 6 6 does not hold and 6 6 E does not hold, then /I d 6 or /I d E). 
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Fig. 17 
Now, after the failure of RH as a maximal constructive logic, the problem arises of 
devising a maximal constructive logic extending it. To this aim, one may look for an 
extension of HIGRH and try to apply the method illustrated in the previous sections; 
also, the extension is likely to be proper, i.e., HIGRH should not be maximal, since the 
posets of .FnIGRH are not uniquely determined by the final states. 
Thus, first of all the problem is to single out proper subclasses of FnIGRH which 
satisfy (s.d.e.p.) and whose elements are uniquely determined by the final states 
according to some well defined law. Classes of posets of this kind are not, in turn, 
uniquely determined, i.e., there are some alternative classes which seem to be interest- 
ing, even if the corresponding logics should be different; in other words, we believe 
that the set of the maximal constructive logics extending HIGRH contains more than 
one element. 
However, we do not see how to find subclasses of FmcRn satisfying (s.d.e.p.) where 
each element not only is uniquely determined by the final states, but also, for an 
appropriate number of final states, it gives rise, up to isomorphisms, to a unique 
Kripke model with a regular forcing. Also, the analysis of some interesting subclasses 
F of 9&oRH and the attempt of proving, for such subclasses 9, that the correspond- 
ing nonstandard logics Y&8) are maximal nonstandard constructive logics has 
given rise to some difficulties, for which the method illustrated in the previous sections 
does not seem to be powerful enough. 
Presumably, if a maximal nonstandard constructive logic Y,,,(9) would exist for 
a 9 whose elements, for the appropriate sets of final states, do not uniquely determine 
regular Kripke models, then the u-formulas (for the corresponding sets u of proposi- 
tional variables) would be divided into an infinite set of classes of Y_.,(F)-equiva- 
lence. Thus, the search of a maximal nonstandard constructive logic L dividing (for 
some finite v) the u-formulas into an infinite set of classes of L-equivalence might be 
relevant not only for a classification of the maximal (standard and nonstandard) 
constructive logics, but also for an improvement of our method. 
We wish to point out, however, that we do not know any general result allowing or 
preventing the existence of a maximal nonstandard constructive logic L and of a finite 
set v of propositional variables such that L divides the u-formulas into an infinite 
set of classes of L-equivalence. Also, while it seems to be impossible to find a 9’ 
contained in the class of posets fl “D, (characterizing the logic Di of Gabbay and 
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de Jongh) such that Y&Y’) divides the u-formulas into a finite set of classes of 
Y&8’)-equivalence for every finite u, we do not even know whether a maximal 
nonstandard constructive logic extending E(HIGRH) (or, more generally, E(L),)) and 
having a Kripke frames semantics exists at all. Thus, also from this point of view, the 
study of the maximal (standard and nonstandard) constructive extensions of RH is 
relevant and interesting. 
9. Concluding remarks 
We end this paper with a few remarks concerning the previous material, some open 
problems and possible directions of investigation. 
Well, some open problems have been presented at the end of the previous section, 
and involve the existence of maximal nonstandard constructive logics L dividing, for 
some finite v, the u-formulas into an infinite set of classes of L-equivalence, as well as 
the existence of maximal nonstandard constructive logics without Kripke frames 
semantics (the corresponding maximal standard constructive logics would be, a for- 
tiori, without Kripke frames semantics). A further problem concerns the existence of 
a maximal nonstandard constructive logic L = 2’r,,(F) for some 9 (i.e., L has 
a Kripke frames semantics) such that, for every 4’ c S for which L = _Yreg(F’), the 
corresponding (standard) maximal constructive logic S(L) does not coincide with 
Y(F’) (which implies that _Y(F’) is not neg.sat.-determined); if such a L and S(L) 
would exist, then, as remarked after the proof of Theorem I.9 (in Section 1.3), S(L) 
would have no Kripke frames semantics. 
The method developed in this paper provides Kripke frames characterizations of 
maximal standard constructive logics, but, as repeatedly pointed out in the previous 
sections, it says nothing about their axiomatizations. We believe that the problem of 
the axiomatization of these logics is one of the most prominent in this field. We do not 
even know whether decidable maximal standard constructive logics exist at all (on the 
contrary, all the maximal nonstandard constructive logics exhibited in this paper are 
decidable). Perhaps, a further investigation of the still open problem of the axiomatiz- 
ation of Medvedev’s logic (which seems, nevertheless, more approachable than the 
problem of axiomatizing logics such as S(E(CEST)), or S(E(CEST,,)) for II > 2, or 
S(E(CAST))) might provide important insights also for other maximal standard 
constructive logics. Some experience in the study of Medvedev’s logic seems to suggest 
to the authors also the need of improvements of the filtration techniques. 
On the other hand, the method illustrated in this paper provides axiomatizations of 
maximal nonstandard constructive logics. If the task is only to get semantical 
characterizations of these logics and of the corresponding standard ones, then other 
techniques can be used. 
For instance, let g be a class of posets with the following properties: 
~ 9 satisfies (s.d.e.p.). 
- All the elements of 9 are finite. 
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- For every n > 0 there is P E F such that P has n final states and, for every P’ E 9’ 
with n final states, there is a state GL of P such that the cone P, of c( in P is isomorphic 
to P’ (we call P, which is unique up to isomorphisms, a maximal n-poset of 9). 
- For every m > 0 and n such that m < n, if P E B is a maximal m-poset of 9 and 
P’ E-F is a maximal n-poset of 9, then there is a state c( of P’ such that the cone 
P: of c( in P’ is isomorphic to P. 
Also, let L be a (possibly nonconstructive) nonstandard logic satisfying the follow- 
ing properties: 
- L !G Yr,,(.F). 
- For every extensively complete formula W, for every nonstandard constructive logic 
L’ such that L G L’, if P is the poset on which @Lt(L’)/rw is built and 2k is the 
number of final states of P, then there is a state /I of P such that cone Pp of /I in P is 
a 2k-maximal element of 9. 
In these hypotheses, it is not difficult to prove: 
(**) _!Yreg(F) is a maximal nonstandard constructive logic. 
Now, the cases considered in Section I.6 satisfy the above hypotheses, so that 
the related semantical characterizations can be provided using (**); we can 
also appropriately extend the selective filtration technique so as to treat in this 
frame also the case considered in Section 4. On the other hand, we have not 
looked for examples which cannot be treated with the method explained in the 
previous sections but can be handled using the new technique. A fortiori, we do not 
know whether the latter technique can be applied to cases where (even if the posets are 
uniquely determined by the final states) regular Kripke models are not uniquely 
determined by the appropriate sets of final states; surely, it cannot be applied to the 
problem of singling out a maximal nonstandard constructive logic extending 
E(HIGRH). 
In [4] we have given a proof that the set of maximal (standard) constructive logics 
has the power of continuum, a result which is immediately extended (using the 
correspondence described in this paper and in [15]) to the set of maximal nonstan- 
dard constructive logics; as already pointed out, the proof of this result uses Zorn’s 
lemma, i.e., the axiom of choice. Now as we have read in [3], Galanter directly exhibits 
in [9] the semantical characterizations of 2”” constructive logics and claims that they 
are maximal in the set of logics having the same disjunctionless fragment as intuition- 
istic logic, a fortiori in the set of constructive logics. We do not know how Galanter 
proves his claim. However, Galanter’s emantical characterizations we have learned in 
[3] look very likely as maximal constructive logics. Also, it seems to be easy to apply 
our methods to them, so as to prove the existence of 2”0 maximal nonstandard 
constructive logics and of 2’0 maximal standard constructive logics without using the 
axiom ofchoice. More generally, our method seems to be able to single out other sets 
of maximal constructive logics with the power of continuum. 
Finally, this research on the maximal propositional constructive logics naturally 
leads to the problem of singling out maximal (standard) predicate constructive logics 
(i.e., maximal intermediate predicate logics of the usual kind with the disjunction 
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property and the explicit definability property). In [4] we have proved that the set of 
these logics has the power of continuum, again using Zorn’s lemma. However, as far as 
we know, no maximal predicate constructive logic has ever been singled out (using 
a Kripke style semantics, or, at least, some clear and complete description). We do not 
even know whether and to which extent our propositional techniques can be extended 
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